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PSYCHOANALYZING INTERNATIONAL LAW(YERS)  
 
[Author name and biographical footnote to be inserted here after peer review] 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This article reads the work of Martti Koskenniemi – arguably the most significant international legal thinker of 
the post-Cold War era – as an exercise in (Lacanian) psychoanalysis. Excavating the links between Koskenniemi 
and French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, and analysing the origins of those links in Koskenniemi’s debt to the 
Harvard branch of the American Critical Legal Studies (‘CLS’) movement, it argues that over almost thirty years 
Koskenniemi has employed psychoanalytic techniques to re-build the self-confidence of international law(yers).   
 
The success of this confidence-building project explains the acclaim Koskenniemi’s work enjoys. As international 
law’s psychoanalyst he has defined the identity of the international lawyer and mapped the structure of 
international legal argument, stabilising international law’s present reality by synchronising it with narratives 
of its past. Any attempt to destabilise that reality or depart from present structures into an alternative future 
must start from an analysis of Koskenniemi’s methods and it is in this sense, and not out of a more pure interest 
in Koskenniemi’s work, that this article deconstructs Koskenniemi’s oeuvre. It situates his method, reveals his 
choices and explores their limits in an effort to develop (tentative) proposals for a “new” international law(yer) 
and an international legal future outside the structure that Koskenniemi has mapped so effectively and 
affectively.  
 
 
 
 [A] genuine critique of structuralism commits us to working our way completely through it so as 
to emerge . . .  into some wholly different and theoretically more satisfying philosophical 
perspective.
1
 
 
 
 
“le nom-du-père” / “le non du père” / “les non-dupes errant” . . . those who think that they are 
not duped err.
2
 
 
 
 
“those who are not taken in err”
3
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 FREDRIC JAMESON, THE PRISON-HOUSE OF LANGUAGE: A CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF STRUCTURALISM AND RUSSIAN FORMALISM vii (1972).   
2 PAUL VERHAEGHE, ON BEING NORMAL AND OTHER DISORDERS: A MANUAL FOR CLINICAL PSYCHODIAGNOSTICS 68 (footnote 37) (2008) (quoting JACQUES 
LACAN, LE SÉMINAIRES LIVRE XVII: L’ENVERS DE LA PSYCHOANALYSE (1991)).  
3 SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, LESS THAN NOTHING: HEGEL AND THE SHADOW OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 969 (2012) (quoting and translating NICOLAS FLEURY, LE RÉEL 
INSENSÉ: INTRODUCTION À LA PENSÉE DE JACQUES-ALAIN MILLER 93-94 (2010)).  
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A. Introduction 
 
Martti Koskenniemi is perhaps the most significant international legal thinker of recent times. His first book, 
From Apology to Utopia,
4
 has been described as “the most significant late 20
th
 century English language 
monograph in the field of international law,”
5
 his second, Gentle Civilizer,
6
 has been credited with “trigger[ing] 
a ‘historiographical turn’ in the discipline of international law,”
7
 and no textbook is complete without a section 
on Koskenniemi’s work.
8
 Widely regarded as having defined and explained the structure of international law 
and the identity of the international lawyer in the post-Cold War era,
9
 he has virtually unrivalled influence over 
international legal discourse.
10
 Whilst From Apology is the standard reference on international legal theory,
11
 
Koskenniemi’s work extends beyond theory and into international legal practice.
12
 This is reflected in his 
leadership of the final stages of the International Law Commission’s (‘ILC’) important work on fragmentation, 
perhaps the most significant challenge to the coherence of international legal order in modern times.
13
  
 
                                                 
4 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT – REISSUE WITH NEW EPILOGUE (2005) (originally 
published in 1989). 
5 David Kennedy, The Last Treatise: Project and Person, 7(12) GERMAN L.J. 982, 982 (2006). See also Jean d’Aspremont, Martti Koskenniemi, 
the Mainstream, and Self-Reflectivity, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 625 (2016) (on the evolution of the response to From Apology and its central role 
in recent debates about international legal theory).  
6 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001).    
7 Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, Introduction: Towards a Global History of International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 23 (Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters eds., 2012).  
8 See, e.g., JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 45-46 (7d ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2014); MARTIN DIXON, ROBERT MCCORQUODALE & SARAH WILLIAMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW  12, 16 (5d ed., 2011) 
(extract from KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, and web post by Koskenniemi); ANDREW CLAPHAM, BRIERLY’S LAW OF NATIONS xii (2d 
ed., 2012) (“Although legal methods may . . . vary, understanding the deeper structures and the legal labels used to explain them is 
essential to seeing how international law works” (footnote, referencing the whole of KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, omitted)).  
9 See Deborah Z Cass, Navigating the Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law, 65 NORDIC J INT’L L 341, 342 (1996) 
(observing “post Cold War confidence in international law has been replaced by a muted anxiety about its limitations”); id. at 360, 383 (on 
Koskenniemi’s response to the “anxiety” identified at 342); David Kennedy, The Last Treatise, supra note 5, at 990 (“He has opened up the 
field’s professional practices for [political] contestation”); Jason A. Beckett, Rebel Without a Cause? Martti Koskenniemi and the Critical 
Legal Project, 7(12) German L.J. 1045, 1045 (2006) (“Few books have attained the influence and impact of Martti Koskenniemi’s From 
Apology to Utopia”).  
10 Koskenniemi is, for example, a contributor to many of the most significant edited collections. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, Projects of 
World Community, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2012); Martti Koskenniemi, A History of 
International Law Histories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 943 (Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters eds., 
2012); Martti Koskenniemi, Transformations of Natural Law: Germany 1648-1815, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 59 (Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann eds., 2016).  
11 See David Kennedy, The Last Treatise, supra note 5, at 982 (“Martti Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia is the most significant late 
twentieth century English language monograph in the field of international law . . . it could well turn out to have been the last great 
original treatise in the international law field”); Mario Prost, Born Again Lawyer: FATU as An Antidote to the “Positivist Blues”, 7(12) 
GERMAN L.J. 1037, 1037 (2006) (“[From Apology] might very well have been the single most influential book of the last 15 years in the field 
of international legal theory”).    
12 See Martti Koskenniemi’s CV, http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Staff/Koskenniemi_CV.pdf (last visited July 28 2016) (on Koskenniemi’s practice 
experience).  
13 See Anne-Charlotte Martineau, The rhetoric of fragmentation: fear and faith in international law, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1 (2009); Gerhard 
Hafner, Risks Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Annex, at 143. UN. Doc. A/55/10 
(2000); Tomer Broude, Keep Calm and Carry On: Martti Koskenniemi and the Fragmentation of International Law, 27 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 279 (2016); Sean D. Murphy, Deconstructing Fragmentation: Koskenniemi’s 2006 ILC Project, 27 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 293 (2016). 
See also Akbar Rasulov, From Apology to Utopia and the Inner Life of International Law, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 641, 646 (2016), commenting, in 
terms that seem to capture the relationship between Koskenniemi’s fragmentation work and his work more generally, for all that Rasulov 
himself does not make this connection: “[w]hat the author of [From Apology] recognized from the very outset . . . was that the key to 
winning any kind of intra-disciplinary theoretical struggles in modern international law lies in producing not just a new set of critical-
theoretical ideas accessible primarily to professional legal academics, but a new system of intellectual tools and concepts accessible above 
all to the community of international legal practitioners: a system of tools and concepts which the practising lawyers could use to describe 
and express their day-to-day professional experiences and anxieties.” 
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This article reads Koskenniemi’s work as an exercise in Lacanian psychoanalysis; an application of Jacques 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory to international law and international lawyers.
14
 Casting Koskenniemi as 
Lacanian analyst and international law(yers) as analysand or patient, it treats Koskenniemi’s psychoanalysis as 
a process which “enable[s]” the patient to “get over itself”,
15
 a course of therapy which “enable[s]” the patient 
to recognise and live with(in) his neurosis by accepting that it cannot be “cure[d]."
16
  
 
The argument develops in three parts. The first (Diagnosis) excavates the Lacanian foundations of 
Koskenniemi’s work, the second (Therapy) links Koskenniemi’s work and Ernesto Laclau’s political theory, and 
the third (Prognosis) considers the patient’s health and prospects after therapy. 
  
Psychoanalysis has, I argue, given the patient a modern, elitist self-confidence, inuring it to the injustices of 
global postmodernity.
17
 The patient needs “new codes,”
18
 specifically, new historical-materialist codes,
19
 
through which to re-imageine itself and engage with global postmodernity,
20
 because: 
 
[o]ur [postmodern] social order is richer in information and more literate, and socially, at least, 
more ‘democratic’ in the sense of the universalization of wage labor . . . [and] this new order no 
longer needs prophets and seers of the high modernist and charismatic type, whether among its 
cultural producers . . . its politicians 
21
 
 
or, indeed, its international lawyers.
22
  
 
It is important to be clear about the nature and extent of the claims I am making about Koskenniemi’s work. In 
reading Koskenniemi’s work as a psychoanalysis of international law(yers) I am not claiming that it is a 
psychoanalysis of international law(yers), nor that this is the only viable reading. I am, however, claiming that 
                                                 
14 See COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 297-318 (2000) (on the relevance of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis to the study of law);  David S. Caudill, Freud and Critical-Legal Studies: Contours of  Radical Socio-Legal 
Psychoanalysis, 66 INDIANA L.J. 651, 669-74 (1990-1991) (on Lacanian psychoanalysis and law); Anthony Carty, Language Games of 
International Law: Koskenniemi as the Discipline’s Wittgenstein, 13 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 859, 867 (2012) (suggesting that Koskenniemi’s 
1999 text, Between Commitment and Cynicism, infra note 90, “provide[s] a window . . . into the psychological state of the profession”); 
Sahib Singh, The Critic(al Subject), <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2648277> (last visited September 5 2016), at 3 
(noting that “smatterings of psychoanalytic [theory] . . . undergird From Apology to Utopia”); Maria Aristodemou, A Constant Craving for 
Fresh Brains and a Taste for Decaffeinated Neighbours, (2014) EUR. J. INT’L L. 35 (2014) (applying Lacanian psychoanalysis to the study of 
international legal theory).  
15 Aristodemou, supra note 14, at 37.  
16 Id. (“the message from the (nasty) Lacanian analyst is not to cure the patient’s ego and return it to her well adjusted to reality – in other 
words, not to strengthen and perpetuate international law’s self-delusions but to lead it, kicking and screaming no doubt, to finding out 
the bloody histories that constituted it as a subject and enable it, in short, to ‘get over itself’”). See also, in the context of international 
criminal law, and with reference to Koskenniemi’s work, Frédéric Mégret, The Anxieties of International Criminal Justice, 29(1) LEIDEN J.  
INT’L L. 197 (2016).  
17 See FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM 2 (1991) (“the prophetic elitism and authoritarianism of the 
modern movement [in architecture] are remorselessly identified with the charismatic Master”); David Kennedy, Apology to Utopia: The 
Structure of International Legal Argument, 31 HARVARD J. INT’L L. 385, 387 (1990) (“[Koskenniemi] seems determined to narrate his 
discipline to its end – to write the last modern book on public international law”).   
18 JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, supra note 17, at 394.  
19 See Carty, supra note 14, at 865 (advocating “a phenomenological posture vis-à-vis reality for which new languages need to be found”).   
20 See Matthew Nicholson, Walter Benjamin and the Re-Imageination of International Law, 27 LAW AND CRITIQUE 103 (2016).   
21 JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, supra note 17, at 306.  
22 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Martti Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia: A Reflection, 7(12) GERMAN L.J. 1089, 1091 (2006) (“while I 
agree wholeheartedly [with Koskenniemi] that international law is what international lawyers make of it, I am not sure that there is a clear 
consensus that all practitioners need to be international lawyers, especially in the post-modern world of the early 21st century when 
international law-talk is occurring at the popular level”).   
4 
 
Koskenniemi’s work can and should be read as a Lacanian psychoanalysis,
23
 and that this reading provides the 
basis for re-thinking international law’s present and future.  
 
Recasting these claims in the language of Fredric Jameson’s The Political Unconscious,
24
 this article presents 
Lacanian psychoanalysis as the “hidden master narrative” of Koskenniemi’s work,
25
 the “allegorical key” that 
unlocks and reveals the relationship between its “multiple meanings,”
26
 “unmask[ing]” his texts as “socially 
symbolic acts,”
27
 therapeutic exercises that have “enable[d]” international law to “get over itself.”
28
 It is in this 
sense, and whilst recognising that my reading is not the only reading, that I argue for its “priority”:
 29
  
[I]t projects a rival hermeneutic to those already enumerated . . . not so much by repudiating 
their findings as by arguing its ultimate philosophical and methodological priority over more 
specialized interpretive codes whose insights are strategically limited as much by their own 
situational origins as by the narrow or local ways in which they construe or construct their 
objects of study.
30 
 
 
B. DIAGNOSIS 
 
I. Myth and Neurosis  
 
The opening page of Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 
published in 1989 and reissued in 2005, diagnoses international law’s neurosis:  
Lawyers seem to have despaired over seeing their specific methodology and subject-matter 
vanish altogether if popular calls for sociological or political analyses are taken seriously. 
Ultimately, they believe, there is room for a specifically ‘legal’ discourse between the sociological 
                                                 
23 See Caudill, supra note 14, at 654 (“My thesis is that psychoanalytic theory offers insights with which to confront some of the 
problematic aspects of CLS [critical legal studies] – insights that are already contains within the radical traditions on which CLS draws”).   
24 FREDRIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY SYMBOLIC ACT (1981). See Matthew Nicholson, The 
Political Unconscious of the English Foreign Act of State and Non-Justiciability Doctrine(s), 64(4) INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 743 (2015) 
(using Jameson’s concept of the “political unconscious” in legal analysis).  
25 JAMESON, POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 24, at 13.  
26 Id. See also id. at 14 (“Allegory is . . . the opening up of the text to multiple meanings, to successive rewritings and 
overwritings which are generated as so many levels and as so many supplementary interpretations”); Paavo Kotiaho, A 
Return to Koskenniemi, or the Disconcerting Co-optation of Rupture, 7(12) GERMAN L.J. 484, 485 (2006) (noting a 
“contradiction between the appearance and essence of Koskenniemi’s work”).  
27 JAMESON, POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 24, at 5 (“The assertion of a political unconscious proposes that we . . . explore 
the multiple paths that lead to the unmasking of cultural artifacts as socially symbolic acts”).  
28 Aristodemou, supra note 14, at 37. 
29 The most compelling readings of Koskenniemi’s work in the literature, over which I claim this psychoanalytic reading has “priority”, are 
Beckett, supra note 9 (critiquing what Beckett sees as inconsistencies in Koskenniemi’s work); Rasulov, supra note 13 (focussing on the 
importance of “Kelsenian legal positivism” and “Saussurean structuralist semiotics” in FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4. Id. at 641); Justin 
Desautels-Stein, Chiastic law in the crystal ball: exploring legal formalism and its alternative futures, 2 LONDON R. INT’L L. 263 (2014) (reading 
Koskenniemi through the work of Soren Kierkegaard); Sahib Singh, Koskenniemi’s Images of the International Lawyer, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 
699 (2016) (reading Koskenniemi through the work of Jean-Paul Sartre); Singh, The Critic(al Subject), supra note 14 (again reading 
Koskenniemi through the work of Jean-Paul Sartre); John Haskell, From Apology to Utopia’s Conditions of Possibility, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 667 
(2016) (focussing on the historical aspects of FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4). Where relevant, in footnotes infra I explain how my reading 
relates to the alternative readings offered by these authors.   
30 JAMESON, POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 24, at 5. See id. at x (on Marxist literary interpretation); See also Rasulov, supra note 13, at 
642 (advancing an argument with a similar intention – “excavating [From Apology] from beneath the mountain of misreadings and 
misrememberings under which it has come to be so unceremoniously buried over the last quarter-century”, id.  – which also draws on 
Jameson’s POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS); Singh, The Critic(al Subject), supra note 14, at 6 (footnote 28) (making a passing reference to Jameson’s 
POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS). 
5 
 
and the political . . . and that this is the sphere in which lawyers must move if they wish to 
maintain their professional identity as something other than social or moral theorists.
31
  
 
Koskenniemi rejects the possibility of a “specifically ‘legal’ discourse” as a response to the threat from 
“sociological or political analyses.” “The structure of international legal argument” is defined by the “dynamics 
of [the] contradiction” between “normativity” and “concreteness”;
32
 there is no way out:
33
  
 
A law which would lack distance from State behaviour will or interest would amount to a non-
normative apology, a mere sociological description [“concreteness”]. A law which would base 
itself on principles which are unrelated to State behaviour, will or interest would seem utopian, 
incapable of demonstrating its own content in any reliable way [“normativity”].
34
 
 
“Concreteness” and “normativity” are “criteria” for legal “objectivity”,
35
 prerequisites for an international law 
that exists “independently of what anyone might think that the law should be” and “appli[es] even against a 
State (or other legal subject) which opposed its application to itself.”
36
 The lesson of From Apology’s chapters 
two to six, covering fundamental and diverse topics such as sovereignty, the sources of international law and 
the interpretation of treaties, is that “the structure of international legal discourse on all doctrinal spheres 
undermine[s] the objectivity on which it constructed itself,”
37
 that “law is constantly lapsing into what seems 
like factual description or political prescription.”
38
  
 
 “[T]he legal mind [therefore] fights a battle on two fronts,”
39
 trapped between “‘descending’ and ‘ascending’ 
patterns of justification,” the former “premised on the assumption that a normative code overrides individual 
State behaviour,” the latter “on the assumption that State behaviour, will and interest are determining of the 
law.”
40
 “[T]here is [ultimately] no real discourse going on within legal argument . . . but only a patterned 
exchange of argument” between the two “patterns.”
41
 International law does not, therefore, exist in a 
“specifically ‘legal’ discourse” situated “between the sociological and the political,”
42
 but as an oscillation 
“between the sociological and the political.”
43
   
 
The anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, following Sigmund Freud’s work on psychoanalysis, recognised that 
“two traumas . . . are necessary in order to generate the individual myth in which a neurosis consists.”
44
 It is 
                                                 
31 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 1.  
32 Id. at 58 (sub-heading 1.3), 17.   
33 See id. at 16 (“intellectual operations [which seek to distinguish international law from the sociological and the political] do not leave 
room for any specifically legal discourse”). 
34 Id. at 17.  
35 Id. at 513.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 515.   
38 Id. at 16.  
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 59.  
41 Id. at 511-12.  
42 Id. at 1.  
43 Id. See also id. at 65 (“doctrine is forced to maintain itself in constant movement from emphasizing concreteness to emphasizing 
normativity and vice versa without being able to establish itself permanently in either position”).   
44 Patrice Maniglier, Acting Out the Structure, in CONCEPT AND FORM VOLUME TWO: INTERVIEWS AND ESSAYS FROM THE CAHIERS POUR L’ANALYSE 25, 41 
(Peter Hallward and Knox Peden eds., 2012) (quoting Claude Levi-Strauss, The Structural Study of Myth, in CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 228 (1963)). See KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 6 (footnote 1), 8 (footnote 4), and 11 (footnote 9), referring to 
two of Levi-Strauss’ major works without subjecting them to sustained analysis. See also Caudill, supra note 14, at 670 (on structuralism, 
6 
 
the impossibility of finding validation in either “the sociological [or] the political” (first trauma),
45
 together with 
the unavailability of a tenable position between the domains (second trauma), that “generate[s] the . . . myth” 
of a “specifically ‘legal’ discourse.” Koskenniemi diagnoses international law’s neurosis as “consist[ing]” in that 
myth, “in” the oscillation between “concreteness” and “normativity.”  
 
Lacan explores the relationship between trauma, myth, and neurosis, mapped by Levi-Strauss, by re-evaluating 
Freud’s case of “The Rat Man.”
46
 The parallels between Lacan’s analysis of the Rat Man and Koskenniemi’s 
analysis of international law are, as we will see, significant.  
 
II. Lacan and the Rat Man 
 
The Rat Man’s father, a soldier, “gambled away the regimental funds,” relied on “a friend” to bail him out,
47
 
and failed to reimburse the friend, who disappeared.
48
 The family remembers and speaks of this “episode in 
the father’s past” and “a kind of belittlement by his contemporaries permanently follows” him.
49
  
 
As a young man, the father had a “strong attachment . . . to a poor but pretty girl” but he married the woman 
who would become the Rat Man’s mother because she “occupie[d] a much higher station in the bourgeoisie 
and [brought him] . . . both the means of livelihood and even the job he [held] at the time they [were] 
expecting their child.”
50
  
 
When “[the Rat Man’s] father urged him to marry a rich woman [possibly his cousin] the neurosis proper had 
its onset.”
51
 He ordered new glasses for delivery by post from his optician in Vienna, having lost his original 
glasses at around the time he flirted with “a servant girl . . . during maneuvers.”
52
 After losing the glasses an 
army captain told the Rat Man about a form of punishment in which “a rat stimulated by artificial means is 
inserted into the rectum of the victim.”
53
 Once the glasses arrived the captain told the Rat Man “that he must 
reimburse Lieutenant A who is in charge of the mail and who is supposed to have paid” for the delivery of the 
glasses.
54
 The charges were, in fact, paid by “[a] generous lady at the post office” rather than Lieutenant A and, 
in any event, Lieutenant B was responsible for the mail.
55
  
 
To fulfil his self-imposed obligation to the captain the Rat Man devised a plan: “Lieutenant A will reimburse the 
generous lady at the post office, and, in his presence, she must pay over the sum in question to Lieutenant B 
                                                                                                                                                        
Levi-Strauss and Lacan). Singh, The Critic(al Subject), supra note 14, at 3, 10 and 14, suggests, with reference to Roland Barthes, that 
“myth” plays an important role in Koskenniemi’s work without, however, defining the specific “myth,” or the function of “myth” as a 
concept, in Koskenniemi’s work. 
45 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 1.  
46 See Maniglier, supra note 44, at 41. See also Frederick J Wertz, Freud’s Case of the Rat Man Revisited: An Existential-Phenomenological 
and Socio-Historical Analysis, 34(1) JOURNAL OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 47 (2003) (on the case of the Rat Man).    
47 Jacques Lacan, The Neurotic’s Individual Myth, 48 PSYCHOANALYTICAL QUARTERLY 405, 411 (1979).  
48 Id. at 414.  
49 Id. at 411.  
50 Id. See also Maniglier, supra note 44, at 42.  
51 Lacan, Myth, supra note 47, at 411. See also Maniglier, supra note 44, at 42.  
52 Lacan, Myth, supra note 47, at 412, 415.   
53 Id. at 409.  
54 Id. at 412.  
55 Id. at 413. See also Maniglier, supra note 44, at 43.  
7 
 
and then he himself will reimburse Lieutenant A.”
56
 Linked to this neurotic plan, the Rat Man suffered 
delusional fantasies about the infliction of the rat punishment on his (dead) father or the “servant girl.”
57
  
 
“[T]he neurotic’s individual myth” involved a “phantasmic scenario” of debt, love and punishment in which the 
Rat Man “re-enact[ed] a ceremony which reproduce[d] almost exactly [the] inaugural relationship” of “the 
father, the mother, and the friend.”
58
 The captain stands in a position similar to that of the father. The Rat Man 
feels a duty to obey him (the captain) “even though (or, rather, because he knows that) he has no grounds for 
obeying him.”
59
 The fact that the Rat Man feels compelled to obey the captain / father despite the fact that he 
feels he / they have no right expect obedience causes him to fantasise about inflicting the rat punishment on 
his father.
60
  
 
By gambling away the regiment’s money and failing to repay his friend’s loan the father castrated himself.
61
 
That established a chain of events that led him to marry the rich girl (the Rat Man’s mother) rather than the 
“poor but pretty girl” he seems to have loved. The father’s (supposedly) poor choices locked the Rat Man into a 
“perennially unsatisfying turning maneuver” which “never succeeds in closing the loop.”
62
 Repaying the debt to 
the “lady at the post office” / Lieutenant B / Lieutenant A would, in the Rat Man’s neurotic mind, “[close] the 
loop” by re-writing his / his father’s history,
63
 un-castrating both men, restoring their “viril[ity]” and allowing 
them to live according to their own free will rather than in circumstances dictated by fate and error.
64
  
 
For Lacan “the wellspring of analytic experience” is the shedding of “more light” on the neurotic’s condition,
65
 
not by curing the neurosis but by enabling the neurotic to understand the causes of his condition so that he 
can accept and exist within his structure.
66
 The analyst facilitates this process of adjustment by:  
 
assum[ing] almost surreptitiously, in the symbolic relationship with the subject, the position of . . 
. the master – the moral master, the master who initiates the one still in ignorance into the 
dimension of fundamental human relationships and who opens for him what one might call the 
way to moral consciousness, even to wisdom, in assuming the human condition.
67
  
 
Lacan’s analysis of the Rat Man’s neurosis maps onto Koskenniemi’s analysis of international law’s relationship 
with sociology / apology vs. politics / utopia, leading to two key conclusions. First, that Koskenniemi treats 
international law as a neurotic patient and, second, that in doing so he becomes international law’s analyst / 
“master.”
68
  
                                                 
56 Lacan, Myth, supra note 47, at 413.  
57 Id. at 412.  
58 Id. at 414.  
59 Maniglier, supra note 44, at 43.  
60 Id.  
61 See Lacan, Myth, supra note 47, at 415 (“the frustration, indeed a kind of castration of the father”).    
62 Id.  
63 See Jacques Lacan, The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire, in JACQUES LACAN, ÉCRITS  671, 698 (Bruce Fink trans., 2006) 
(“The Father the neurotic wishes for is clearly the dead Father – that is plain to see. But he is also a Father who would be the perfect 
master of his desire – which would be just as good, as far as the subject is concerned”).   
64 See Lacan, Myth, supra note 47, at 416-17.  
65 Id. at 425.  
66 Id. at 407.  
67 Id. at 407-08.  
68 See David Kennedy, The Last Treatise, supra note 5, 991 (“I continue to be struck . . . by the relative scarcity of work picking up, 
reworking, extending, or contesting the broad argument of From Apology to Utopia . . . Martti’s book is rarely challenged or deeply 
engaged . . . I often have the feeling that the book’s symbolic meaning has somehow overtaken its analysis”); Jan Klabbers, Towards a 
Culture of Formalism? Martti Koskenniemi and the Virtues, 27 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 417, 418 (2016) (commenting on Kennedy’s review 
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Koskenniemi’s four-part, two-group structure of sociology / apology and politics / utopia can be represented 
thus:  
 
Politics (“the political”) 
 
Sociology (“the sociological”) 
Utopia Apology 
 
This mirrors – indeed, the above diagram is based on the structure of – this representation, by Patrice 
Maniglier, of the Rat Man’s “[f]amilial [c]omplex”:
69
 
 
Father 
 
Wife 
Friend Poor woman 
 
Merging the two diagrams above makes the parallels between the Rat Man’s neurosis and international law’s 
neurotic condition clear: 
 
Politics / Father 
 
Sociology / Wife  
Utopia / Friend Apology / Poor woman 
  
“Normativity” and “concreteness” might be added to the picture as synonyms for utopia and apology but that 
does nothing to disturb the four-part, two-group structure.  
 
Politics is the unsatisfied, dead father who would have his son (international law) be a “real man,” bending the 
world to his will. The unachievability of this ambition is reflected in the connection Koskenniemi establishes 
between politics and utopia; utopia is, by definition, a non-place, a dead father. The parallel between utopia 
for international law and the friend in the story of the Rat Man is established by the fact that the friend has 
vanished; the son / Rat Man cannot repay the debt to him even if he wants to because he cannot find him, in 
the same way that international law is unable to find utopia.  
 
Sociology is international law’s wife / mother. The story of the Rat Man is permeated by a sense that the father 
married the wrong woman. The tacit argument in the family’s history is that if he were a “real man” he would 
have married the “poor but pretty girl,” found money and status for himself rather than through marriage, and 
secured utopia rather than settling for an apology of a marriage. International law’s relationship with sociology 
– with the concrete reality of the world – is similarly apologetic. To accept the world as it is, rather than as you 
would have it be, is to deny utopia and castrate yourself in the interests of an easy life. 
 
International law, like the Rat Man, cannot satisfy its father (politics), cannot find its missing friend / “true” 
lover (utopia), and, by satisfying its mother / wife (sociology), apologises for its lack of virility. Faced with no 
choice outside of this utopia / apology structure, international law / the Rat Man “makes a perennially 
unsatisfying turning maneuver and never succeeds in closing the loop”:
70
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
of From Apology: “From Apology to Utopia, or Koskenniemi’s work in general, is treated as the gospel, the final word marking, as 
Fukuyama might be tempted to put it, “the end of history.” (footnote omitted)); Singh, The Critic(al Subject), supra note 14, at 11 (“The 
image we see in From Apology to Utopia is that of a critic who aspires to less domination as his ideal, all the while constantly perpetuating 
a form of domination himself”).  
69 Maniglier, supra note 44, at 42.  
70 Lacan, Myth, supra note 47, at 415.  
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The dynamics of international legal argument is provided by the contradiction between the 
ascending and descending patterns of argument and the inability to prefer either. Reconciliatory 
doctrines will reveal themselves as either incoherent or making a silent preference . . . doctrine is 
forced to maintain itself in constant movement from emphasizing concreteness to emphasizing 
normativity and vice-versa without being able to establish itself permanently in either position.
71
  
 
Lacan’s analysis of the Rat Man revises Freud’s theory of the structural causes of neurosis.
72
 As David Macey 
explains, Freud understood neurosis as a result of children being unable to make the “difficult transition from 
an immediate relationship with the mother” into “a triangular situation” that also included “the father.”
73
 
Lacan prefers a four-part structure, with an “emphasis . . . on more abstract and universal structures of kinship 
and alliance,”
74
 to Freud’s two-part structure of mother / father and his emphasis on the “family.”
75
  
 
Lacan’s preference is explained by his debt to Levi-Strauss.
76
 As Macey explains, Levi-Strauss applied Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s and, in particular, Roman Jakobson’s work on the structure of language, to the study of culture.
77
 
For Jakobson “a phoneme is a basic unit of signification . . . a [purely] differential unit,”
78
 a form without 
content or fixed meaning.  Levi-Strauss adopts this concept of the “phoneme” in his analysis of the prohibition 
on incest as “an empty but indispensable form, making both possible and necessary the articulation of 
biological groups in a network of exchange that allows them to communicate with one another.”
79
 Maniglier 
charts Levi-Strauss’s application of this structural-linguistic understanding of human behaviour to the study of 
myth and neurosis, noting the connection with Lacan’s Rat Man analysis.
80
  
 
Macey’s and Maniglier’s analysis of the links between Saussure and Jakobson (linguistics), Levi-Strauss 
(anthropology), and Lacan (psychoanalysis) situates neurosis as a product of the neurotic’s troubled 
relationship with his mythical structure. The patient’s behaviour – in the context of sovereignty doctrine, or 
questions about the nature of customary international law, for example  – can be understood through 
“kinship” ties to father, mother, wife, friend and lover / politics, sociology, utopia and apology.  
 
In From Apology Koskenniemi diagnoses international law’s neurosis, “initiat[ing] the one still in ignorance” – 
international law itself – “into the dimension of fundamental . . .  relationships . . . open[ing] . . . what one 
might call the way to moral consciousness, even to wisdom, in assuming the [international legal] . . .  
condition.”
81
 From Apology allows international law(yers) to “[assume] the [international legal] condition” by 
encouraging it / them to live with(in) international law’s “mythic network.”
82
 Koskenniemi’s “project is to try to 
revive a sense of [international law’s] original mission, its importance. I suspect I am creating a myth (for it 
                                                 
71 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 65.  
72 Maniglier, supra note 44, 41-46.  
73 David Macey, Introduction, in JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS vii, xxv (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Alan 
Sheridan trans., 1994).  
74 Id. at xxiii.  
75 See id. at xxiii – xxv.  
76 See DOUZINAS, supra note 14, at 301 (“Jacques Lacan . . . turn[ed] Freud’s story [about the origins of law in murder, crime, and violence] 
into a mythical structure and . . . read it, in a way similar to Levi-Strauss’s explanation of the elementary structures of kinship”).  
77 Macey, supra note 73, at xxiii.  
78 Id. at xxiii 
79 Id. at xxiv.  
80 Maniglier, supra note 44, 39-46. See also Lacan, Subversion, supra note 63, at 676-77 (on his work, Freud, Saussure and Jakobson).  
81 Lacan, Myth, supra note 47, at 407-08.  
82 Id. 415.  
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probably never was much better) – but myth-creation is an important aspect of political activity and 
activism.”
83
  
 
From Apology maps the “twisted relations” between “normativity” and “concreteness,” tracing the “echoes” of 
the double trauma of pursuing sociological and political validation across “all [of international law’s] doctrinal 
spheres.”
84
 This mapping leads to the conclusion that “there is no real discourse going on in international legal 
argument but only a patterned exchange of argument,”
85
 and that means that “recourse to equity, good faith 
and the like” is “less a cause for despair than for hope.”
86
 “[T]he objectivist dream [of a determinative 
discourse] was faulted from the outset” and “lawyers [therefore] need to take seriously their unconscious shift 
into arguing from moral obligation.”
87
 The international lawyer remains “constrained . . . inasmuch as he 
experiences the conflicting pull of the criticisms of [his “kinship” with wife / mother / sociology / 
concreteness/] apology and [his “kinship” with father / politics / friend / lover / normativity/] utopia, [but] he is 
not fully so.”
88
 There is a limited freedom for the international lawyer, but only within the “kinship” structure.
89
  
 
In “Between Commitment and Cynicism,”
90
 his most overtly psychological text,
91
 Koskenniemi notes that whilst 
utopianism attracts practitioners to international law experience moves them towards cynicism.
92
 International 
lawyers cannot be entirely “genuine” in their commitment to international law, rejecting any and all cynicism, 
because “an unwavering belief in its intrinsic goodness” is untenable.
93
 We are left with the consolation prize 
of the “light” that psychoanalysis shines onto the condition of international lawyers,
94
 illuminating our neurotic 
place in international law’s (mythical) structure.   
 
III. International Law “as a language”  
Language both in its structure and action is homologous with the law . . . ‘the law of man has 
been the law of language since the first words of recognition.’ 
95
 
 
[T]he unconscious is structured as a language 
96
 
 
                                                 
83 Emmanuel Jouannet, Koskenniemi: A Critical Introduction, in MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 1 (2011) (quoting 
Koskenniemi’s comment, in 2004, at the Sorbonne).  
84 Maniglier, supra note 44, at 41 (“it is not an isolated event which can be traumatizing but rather the kind of twisted relations that it 
bears with another event, which it echoes . . . by transforming it in a way which then makes it impossible for it not to be endlessly 
repeated”); KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 515 (“all doctrinal spheres”).  
85 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 511.  
86 Id. at 511, 515.  
87 Id. at 515.  
88 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 549.  
89 See Beckett, supra note 9, at 1087 (“law is not our tool; we are constructs of international legality”).    
90 Martti Koskenniemi, Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline of a Theory of International Law as Practice, in COLLECTION OF ESSAYS BY 
LEGAL ADVISERS OF STATES, LEGAL ADVISERS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRACTITIONERS IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 495 (1999).  
91 Id. at 497 (“I shall aim at providing a somewhat impressionistic sketch of the structure of the psychological positions available to 
international law practitioners”).  
92 Id. at 498, 502-06.  
93 Id. at 497.  
94 Lacan, Myth, supra note 47, at 425 (“more light”).  
95 DOUZINAS, supra note 14, 305 (quoting Jacques Lacan, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in  Psychoanalysis, in Jacques 
Lacan, ÉCRITS 197, 225 (Bruce Fink trans., 2006) (Douzinas uses a different version of Lacan’s text)).  
96  Jacques Lacan, Of Structure as the Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever, LACAN.COM, 
http://www.lacan.com/hotel.htm (last visited June 7 2016).  
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‘structured’ and ‘as a language’ for me mean exactly the same thing.
97
 
 
Understanding international law, in Koskenniemi’s terms, “as a language” does not offer normative clarity in 
particular cases,
98
 nor is it possible to explain the content of the language through particular events or 
concrete facts. À la Saussure’s theory of language, international legal “[m]eaning is not . . . present in the 
expression itself” but “relational.”
99
 International legal words or terms “are somehow self-defining,”
100
 “like 
holes in a net . . . [e]ach empty in itself . . . identi[fied] only through the strings which separate it from the 
neighbouring holes.”
101
 “Knowing a language – understanding the meaning of words – is to be capable of 
operating these differentiations,”
102
 and it is “the feeling of the native speaker which remains . . . the test of 
the presence or absence of distinctive features.”
103
  
 
Koskenniemi’s Saussurean approach distinguishes between “the system of differences within which the 
meaning of speech-acts is constituted,” or “langue,” and “individual, historical speech-acts,” or “paroles,” 
focussing on the former (“langue”) as the structurally determinative force in language and discourse.
104
 A 
prioritisation of present system (“the synchronic”) over past acts (“the diachronic”) defines Saussurean 
linguistics, according to Fredric Jameson.
105
 “[T]he synchronic” is concerned with “the immediate lived 
experience of the native speaker” or,
106
 as Macey puts it, “the dimension in which language exists as a 
system.”
107
 From Apology is a synchronic, internal, linguistic account of international law’s ontology and 
practice; an account of international law “as a language,” “a system of production of good legal arguments,” 
written by and from the perspective of a “native language-speaker.”
108
 “Diachrony,” the antithesis of 
synchrony, “is the historical dimension in which languages evolve.”
109
 It “rests on a kind of intellectual 
construction, the result of comparisons between one moment of lived time and another by someone who 
stands outside  . . . substitut[ing] a purely intellectual continuity for a lived one.”
110
  
 
Lacan, like Saussure, prefers the synchronic to the diachronic:  
 
A psychoanalyst should find it easy to grasp the fundamental distinction between signifier and 
signified . . . The first network, that of the signifier, is the synchronic structure of the material of 
language insofar as each element takes on its precise usage therein by being different from the 
others; this is the principle of distribution that alone regulates the function of the elements of 
language [langue] at its different levels, from the phonemic pair of oppositions to compound 
                                                 
97 Id.  
98 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 568.  
99 Id. at 8-9. See also id., at 8 (footnote 4) (inviting the reader to “[s]ee generally Saussure (Course)”). See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN 
GENERAL LINGUISTICS 9 (Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye eds., Wade Baskin trans., 1966) (“But what is language [langue]? It is not to be 
confused with human speech [langage], of which it is only a definite part . . . It is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a 
collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty”).  
100 JAMESON, PRISON-HOUSE, supra note 1, at 17.  
101 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 9.  
102 Id. at 9.  
103 JAMESON, PRISON-HOUSE, supra note 1, at 17.  
104 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 7.  
105 JAMESON, PRISON-HOUSE, supra note 1, at 3-39.  
106 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).  
107 Macey, supra note 73, at xxiii.  
108 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 568.  
109 Macey, supra note 73, at xxiii.  
110 JAMESON, PRISON-HOUSE, supra note 1, at 6.  
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expressions, the task of the most modern research being to isolate the stable forms of the latter. 
The second network, that of the signified, is the diachronic set of concretely pronounced 
discourses, which historically affects the first network, just as the structure of the first governs 
the pathways of the second. What dominates here is the unity of signification, which turns out to 
never come down to a pure indication of reality [réel], but always refers to another signification. 
In other words, signification comes about only on the basis of taking things as a whole 
[d’ensemble] . . . The signifier alone guarantees the theoretical coherence of the whole as a 
whole.
111
  
The signifier, which Lacan associates with the synchronic, is that which signifies – language. The signified is that 
which is signified by language – “reality.” Lacan represents the relationship between signifier and signified 
thus:
112
  
 
S 
s 
 
The point, here, is that “linguistics” as a “science is . . . based, in effect, on the primordial position of the 
signifier and the signified as distinct orders initially separated by a barrier resisting signification.”
113
 Because 
“no signification can be sustained except by reference to another signification,”
114
 because “there is no existing 
language [langue] whose ability to cover the field of the signified can be called into question,”
115
 and because 
the notion that “the signifier serves . . . the function of representing the signified, or better, that the signifier 
has to justify . . . its existence in terms of any signification whatsoever” is an “illusion,”
116
 the signifier has 
priority over the signified or, more accurately, “the signifier in fact enters the signified . . . in a form which, 
since it is not immaterial, raises the question of its place in reality.”
117
 As Yannis Stavrakakis explains, for Lacan 
“meaning is produced by signifiers; it springs from the signifier to the signified and not vice versa (as argued by 
realist representationalism).”
118
  
 
Lacan draws extensively on Saussure’s work but “deviate[s] from the Saussurian model.”
119
 “The primacy of the 
signifier is not an idea found in Saussure’s work”;
120
 indeed, as Michel Borch-Jacobsen explains, “Saussure’s 
langue” – which Koskenniemi defines in terms of a “controlling legal langue, the conditions of what can 
acceptably be said within [international law], or what it is possible to think or believe in it”
121
 – “does not gain 
entry into Lacan’s doctrine before having been emptied of all representative functions.”
122
 
 
                                                 
111 Jacques Lacan, The Freudian Thing or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis, in JACQUES LACAN, ÉCRITS 334, 345 (Bruce Fink 
trans., 2006) (paragraph breaks suppressed).  
112 Jacques Lacan, The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, in JACQUES LACAN, ÉCRITS 412, 414 (Bruce Fink trans., 2006).  
113 Id. at 415.  
114 Id. (footnote omitted).  
115 Id. (square brackets in original).  
116 Id. at 416 
117 Id. at 417. 
118 YANNIS STAVRAKAKIS, LACAN AND THE POLITICAL: THINKING THE POLITICAL 25 (1999).  
119  Owen Hewitson, What does Lacan say about the signifier?, LACAN.COM, 20 June 2010, 
http://www.lacanonline.com/index/2010/06/what-does-lacan-say-about-the-signifier/ (last visited June 7 2016).  
120 Id.  
121 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 11.   
122 MIKKEL BORCH-JACOBSEN, LACAN: THE ABSOLUTE MASTER 173 (Douglas Brick trans., 1991).  
13 
 
Saussure’s concept of the relationship between signifier and signified, in contrast to the diagram (‘S’ and ‘s’) 
above depicting Lacan’s concept, can be represented thus:
123
  
 
 
 
Signified 
 
      Signifier  
 
 
As Dany Nobus explains:  
 
The most conspicuous difference between Saussure’s and Lacan’s diagrams concerns the 
positions of the signifier and the signified relative to the bar that separates them. Whereas in 
Saussure’s schema, the signified and the signifier are located above and beneath the bar 
respectively, in Lacan’s version their position has been interchanged. Secondly, whereas 
Saussure’s diagram suggests if not an equivalence, at least a parallelism between the signified 
and the signifier, owing to the similarity with which they are graphically inscribed above and 
beneath the bar, Lacan’s algorithm underscores visually the incompatibility of the term terms. 
For in Lacan’s formula the signifier is written with an upper-case letter (S) and the signified 
appears in lower-case type (s), and is italicized (s).
124
  
 
The signified does not feature in From Apology.
125
 It is a Lacanian inquiry into the internal “dynamics” of 
international legal argument,
126
 and it understands international law as a pure signifier with (Lacanian) 
“primacy” over the signified.
127
   
 
IV. “[F]rom structure to subject”  
 
Despite its emphasis on the perspective of the “native speaker,” international law’s synchronic language is 
“prior” to the subject.
128
 The lawyer / subject is an “effect” of the structure:
129
 “the very relation [he] has to 
[him]self must be rooted in the impossibility of coinciding with [him]self.”
130
  
                                                 
123 Diagram reproduced from Dany Nobus, Lacan’s science of the subject: between linguistics and topology, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
LACAN 50, 52 (Jean-Michel Rabaté ed., 2003).  
124 Id. at 53. See also Ernesto Laclau, Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Constitution of Political Logics, in JUDITH BUTLER, 
ERNESTO LACLAU & SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, CONTINGENCY, HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY: CONTEMPORARY DIALOGUES ON THE LEFT 44, 69 (2000); STAVRAKAKIS, supra 
note 118, at 24-25.  
125 See Rasulov, supra note 13, at 656-63 (commenting, without reference to Lacan or the connection between Lacan and Saussure, on 
Saussurean linguistics and From Apology’s focus on the signifier).   
126 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 58.  
127 Id. at 13 (“By providing an ‘insider’s view’ to international legal discourse”). See David Kennedy, Apology to Utopia, supra note 17, at 
386 (“[r]ather than applying criticisms developed by other fields or writing from a viewpoint outside international law, [Koskenniemi] 
produces a criticism that is internal and, ultimately, situated in the best traditions of the discipline”). See also Carty, supra note 14, at 864 
(“[b]eyond Wittgenstein-style language games there is no reality, no referent”); Rasulov, supra note 13, at  642 (“[From Apology’s] most 
important theoretical legacy [is] a highly novel and very powerful argument in defence of the anti-anti-disciplinarian theoretical agenda in 
the field of academic international legal studies”).    
128 Jacques-Alain Miller, Action of the Structure, in CONCEPT AND FORM VOLUME ONE: KEY TEXTS FROM THE CAHIERS POUR L’ANALYSE 69, 74 (Jean-
Michel Rabaté ed., 2012).  
129 Maniglier, supra note 44, at 27. See also Yves Duroux, Strong Structuralism, Weak Subject, in CONCEPT AND FORM VOLUME TWO: INTERVIEWS 
AND ESSAYS FROM THE CAHIERS POUR L’ANALYSE 187, 199-200 (Peter Hallward and Knox Peden eds., 2012).   
130 Maniglier, supra note 44, at 27. See also DOUZINAS, supra note 14, at 304 (“I must identify with my image in the mirror and with my 
name . . . I must accept division and negativity, I must accept that I am what I am not, in [Arthur] Rimbaud’s felicitous phrase that ‘Je est 
un autre’”).   
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The statement “I am an international lawyer” is circular and meaningless without international law’s 
structure.
131
 The international lawyer is “a paradoxical entity” that “can only constitute itself as being different 
from itself: its very identity is to escape itself.”
132
 The subject / international lawyer “escape[s] itself” by 
subjecting itself to international law’s linguistic structure. This is the Lacanian meaning of the statement “I am 
an international lawyer;”
133
 “[t]he subject speaks and comes into existence by being spoken in language, in 
other words by being alienated one more time from bodily and sensory experience into the cold world of the 
sign.”
134
  
 
From Apology moves “from structure to subject” because the structure has “prior[ity].”
135
 It does this by 
identifying the longed-for “specifically ‘legal’ discourse” as a myth, by mapping neurotic efforts to validate the 
myth in a search for “concreteness” and “normativity”, and by exploring viable modes of practice within the 
linguistic structure that myth and neurosis create:  
 
lawyers expectations of certainty should be downgraded . . . they – as well as States and statesmen 
– must take seriously the moral-political choices they are faced with when arguing ‘within the law’ 
and accept the consequence that in some relevant sense the choices are theirs and that they 
therefore should be responsible for them.
136
  
 
V. Structure / Subject / Suture 
 
If, as Jacques-Alain Miller, Lacan’s collaborator and editor, maintains, “[s]tructure [is] that which puts in place 
an experience for the subject that it includes” then structures are existentially dependent on the “inclu[sion]” 
of a subject.
137
 Without a declaration of subjectivity the subject features in the structure only as a “lack,” as 
something that is “lacking . . . [but] not purely and simply absent.”
138
 “Suture” expresses “lack” in this sense, by 
“nam[ing] the relation of the subject to the chain of its discourse.”
139
 By declaring its subjectivity the subject 
“stand[s]-in” or “tak[es]-the-place-of” the subject that the structure originally lacked,
140
 occupying the space 
that the structure held open for it.
141
  
                                                 
131 Maniglier, supra note 44, at 27 (“the rationale for such a paradoxical definition of subjectivity has to do with the problem of the relation 
between being and subjectivity. Does it make sense to say that “I” am . . . is it possible to apply the category of truth to the subject of 
knowledge itself?”). See also Ernesto Laclau, ‘Power and Representation’, in ERNESTO LACLAU, EMANCIPATION(S) 84, 92 (2007) (“The 
hegemonic subject cannot have a terrain of constitution different from the structure to which it belongs”).   
132 Maniglier, supra note 44, at 28.  
133 See Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127, 140 (1984) (“Structuralism argued that the systematic form of 
language, rather than the particular linguistic elements of actual spoken words, gave rise to intelligibility . . . the role of the speaker as 
agent was displaced. The speaker was now dependent on language itself to engage in meaningful activities . . . The subject was better 
understood as a product of culture, an identity created in language, a potentiality limited by the language that defined the conventions of 
a world”). See also KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 7 (footnote 1), describing Heller’s article as “useful.”  
134 DOUZINAS, supra note 14, at 303.  
135 Miller, supra note 128, at 74.  
136 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 536.  
137 Miller, supra note 128, at 71.  
138 Id. at 93.  
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 See Laclau, Power, supra note 131, at 92 (“the structure is not fully reconciled with itself . . . it is inhabited by an original lack, by a 
radical undecidability that needs to be constantly superseded by acts of decision. These acts are precisely what constitute the subject, who 
can only exist as a will transcending the structure”). See also Slavoj Žižek, Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes Please, in JUDITH BUTLER, 
ERNESTO LACLAU & SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, CONTINGENCY, HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY: CONTEMPORARY DIALOGUES ON THE LEFT 90, 119 (2000) (“for Lacan, the 
subject prior to subjectivization is not some Idealist pseudo-Cartesian self-presence preceding material interpellatory practice and 
apparatuses, but the very gap in the structure that the imaginary (mis)recognition in the interpellatory Call endeavours to fill in”).  Singh, 
The Critic(al Subject), supra note 14, at 9 and 12, wrestles with the relationship between subject and structure in Koskenniemi’s work 
15 
 
 
Ernesto Laclau evokes this notion of a sutured subject, asserting “the subject who takes the decision is only 
partially a subject; he is also a background of sedimented practices organizing a normative framework which 
operates as a limitation on the horizon of options.”
142
 From Apology’s international lawyer is sutured into the 
structure, “stand[ing]-in” the structure’s prefabricated subject-space.  
 
The possibilities of “critical lawyer[ing],”
143
 of a “critical politics which does not need to rely on utopian justice 
nor become an apology of actual power,”
144
 are defined by the structure.
145
 International legal practice “is not 
the application of ready-made, general rules or principles but a conversation about what to do, here and 
now.”
146
 “Uncertainty and choice are an ineradicable part of [international legal] practice” because the notion 
that international law provides unambiguous, ready-made solutions to conflicts involves an “objectification 
mistake,”
147
 treating law as a (definite, defined) object when it is, in fact, an (ambiguous, interpretable) social 
construct.
148
  
 
International lawyers are not only entitled but obliged to make political choices which resolve legal disputes in 
line with their “authentic commitment” to international law,
149
 their “integrity as . . . lawyer[s].”
150
 Being an 
“authentic,” committed international lawyer “is [to exist in] the distance between the undecidability of the 
structure and the decision,”
151
 to live with(in) international law’s neurosis, with(in) the search for 
“concreteness” and “normativity,” by “get[ting] over” the idea that we ought to have found a “specifically 
‘legal’ discourse” by now.
152
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
without reference to “suture” or discussion of its place in the broader Lacanian / Laclauian framework and is, consequently, unable to 
grasp the dialectical, mutually constitutive relationship between subject and structure in Koskenniemi’s work. This leads to the (in my view) 
mistaken conclusion – on which, see also infra note 152 – that “the absolute free and empty subject is presupposed by Koskenniemi’s 
critique.” Id. at 13.  
142 Laclau, Identity and Hegemony, supra note 124, at 82. 
143 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 548.  
144 Id. at 539.  
145 See Caudill, supra note 14, at 660 (footnote 46) (“In Lacan’s [concept of the] unconscious, society precedes individuality”).  
146 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 544.  
147 Id. at 555, 537.   
148 Id. at 537-48.  
149 Id. at 546-47. See also Koskenniemi, Between Commitment and Cynicism, supra note 90, at 512 (“It is, I believe, precisely [the] sense of 
doubt, uncertainty, and occasional schizophrenia . . . that is in the background when international lawyers describe their practice in terms 
of a commitment, instead of, say, a knowledge or a faith”); id. at 508 (“The law brings the committed lawyer to the brink of the (legal) 
decision, but never quite into it. If a civil strife arises, the law tells the lawyer: ‘Here are two rules, “self-determination” and “uti 
possidetis.” Now choose’”).   
150 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 555. See also id. at 498-99 (“To be a voice for no particular interests or position is not a 
lucrative affair; it calls for commitment! . . . This aspect of commitment has to do with the avoidance of politics, prejudice and everything 
else that appears as external, as strictly outside the law and is often described in terms of the good lawyer’s particular ‘integrity’”).  
151 Laclau, Identity and Hegemony, supra note 124, at 79.  
152 Aristodemou, supra note 14, at 37 (“get over”); KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 1 (“specifically ‘legal’ discourse”). See 
Laclau, Power, supra note 131, at 89 (“a contingent intervention taking place in an undecidable terrain is . . .  a hegemonic intervention”). 
See also KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 553 (on the international lawyer’s “role”); Prost, Born Again Lawyer, supra note 11, at 
1039 (“part of what [From Apology] does is illustrate how there is no such thing as an ‘objective’ system of international law, i.e. an 
autonomous law which judges can ‘find’ and use as a non political device for settling disputes, and which students can learn ‘as it is’”); 
Singh, Koskenniemi’s Images, supra note 29. I disagree with Singh when he concludes that “the Sartrean subject [is] at the heart of From 
Apology to Utopia,” claims that “the absolute free and empty subject is presupposed by Koskenniemi’s critique,” and argues that “[s]he 
[the international lawyer] is able to briefly separate herself from the grounds of her own construction.” Singh, id., at 710, 714, 724. 
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, is, in my view, and as explained above, based on a Lacanian understanding of the sutured 
relationship between subject and structure.  
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Koskenniemi’s psychoanalysis of international law is, ultimately, a psychoanalysis of international lawyers also. 
International law and international lawyers are inseparable because the international legal subject is sutured 
into the linguistic structure.
153
  
 
C . THERAPY 
 
I. Hegemony  
 
From Apology is an argument for the hegemony of the international lawyer as a therapeutic response to 
international law’s neurosis.
154
 It advocates political decision-making by international lawyers within 
international law’s linguistic structure as the form of legal practice most appropriate in a fragmented, global 
socio-political context.
155
  
 
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe define hegemony as “appear[ing]” in 
the “context” of a “fault (in the geological sense) . . . a fissure that had to be filled up . . . a contingency that 
had to be overcome.”
156 
Hegemony is something that “fills a space left vacant by a crisis of what . . . should 
have been a normal historical development,”
157
 and it “supposes a theoretical field dominated by the category 
of articulation.”
158
  
 
Laclau and Mouffe define “articulation” as “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their 
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice,”
159
 explaining that “[t]he structured totality resulting 
from the articulatory practice” is a “discourse.”
160
 “[E]lements’” are “floating signifiers, incapable of being 
wholly articulated to a discursive chain,”
161
 and “articulation” involves “the transition from ‘elements’ to 
‘moments,’”
162
 for all that this “transition” is “never entirely fulfilled.”
163
 “[M]oments” are defined as the 
“differential positions . . . articulated within a discourse,”
164
 arguments formed out of a particular arrangement 
of “elements,” and “articulation” ultimately “consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix 
meaning,”
165
 of “points de capiton . . .  privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying chain.”
166
 
                                                 
153 KOSKENNIEMI, GENTLE CIVILIZER, supra note 6, at 7 (“It may be too much to say that international law is only what international lawyers do 
or think. But at least it is that”); Justin Desautels-Stein, From Apology to Utopia’s Point of Attack, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 677, 687 (2016) (“From 
Apology to Utopia suggested that it may very well be impossible to ‘think’ outside of [the] structure of legal thought, and if this was the 
case, then an understanding of the menu of such structures clued us in to the availability of different ways of conceptualizing the 
international legal order”).  
154 See KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 13 (referring to “a therapeutic effect on lawyers”). 
155 See ERNESTO LACLAU AND CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY: TOWARDS A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS x (2d ed. 2001) (“Our 
approach is grounded in privileging the moment of political articulation, and the central category of political analysis is, in our view, 
hegemony”). See also Martti Koskenniemi, “By Their Acts You Shall Know Them . . .” (And Not by Their Legal Theories), 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 839, 
851 (2004) (“all law (and not just semantically unclear law) is infected by indeterminacy. There is, in this sense, no middle-of-the-road 
solution at all: even one that initially seems such, is an occasionalist reliance on a momentarily hegemonic solution”); Desautels-Stein, 
Point of Attack, supra note 153, at 680-81 (“From Apology to Utopia sought to uncover practices of international legal argument in order 
to assist the international community in better understanding the structured relationship between international law and international 
politics” (footnote omitted)).  
156 LACLAU AND MOUFFE, HEGEMONY, supra note 155, at 8.   
157 Id. at 48.  
158 Id. at 93.  
159 Id. at 105. See also Caudill, supra note 14, at 673 (“articulation is always an approximation of truth”).    
160 LACLAU AND MOUFFE, HEGEMONY, supra note 155, at 105.   
161 Id. at 113.  
162 Id. at 110.  
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 105.   
165 Id. at 112.  
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“Articulatory practice” is “possible” only because of the “incomplete,” “contingen[t]” nature of . . . 
discourse,
167
 “the impossibility of fixing ultimate meanings,”
168
 the fact that “no discursive formulation is a 
sutured totality,”
169
 and because “moments [are] never entirely fulfilled.”
170
 Subjects take up “‘subject 
positions’ within a discursive structure” by  “suture[ing]” themselves into
 
it,
171
 and practice hegemony as “a 
political type of relation, a form . . . of politics,”
172
 a “game” played through “articulatory practice” in 
conditions of “contingency and ambiguity . . . social division and antagonism.”
173
 “[H]egemonic articulation” 
takes place in a climate of “antagonism” and “equivalence,”
174
 on the basis that “society” is neither “totally 
possible,” because of irresolvable antagonisms between “subject positions,” nor “totally impossible” because 
of commonalities or equivalences between “subject positions.”
175
  
 
International law “should [, in the course of its] normal historical development,”
176
 have become a “specifically 
‘legal’ discourse [situated] between the sociological [its mother] and the political [its father].”
177
 It did not, and 
that failure left it in a contingent, neurotic state. From Apology argues for hegemonic “articulatory practice” as 
the appropriate methodological response to the fact that the son (international law) is a young adult who did 
not enjoy a “normal historical development,” a healthy adolescence. He is, therefore, unable to satisfy both his 
mother (sociology) and his father (politics), largely because he has still not moved out of the family home and 
found a place of his own:  
Normative imagination – reasoned folly – must take over where legal interpretation left off . . .  
As international lawyers, we have failed to use the imaginative possibilities open to us . . . we 
were cast as players in game, members in somebody’s team. It is not that we need to play the 
game better, or more self-consciously. We need to re-imagine the game, reconstruct its rules, 
redistribute the prizes.
178
 
From Apology’s sotto voce message seems to be that the “game” can be “re-imagine[d]” as hegemony, and 
Koskenniemi makes this almost explicit in a 2004 article arguing for an understanding of international law “as a 
hegemonic technique.”
179
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
166 Id. at 113.  
167 Id. at 110-11. 
168 Id. at 111.  
169 Id. at 106.  
170 Id. at 110.  
171 Id. at 115; Id. at 47, 88 (endnote 1) (“The concept of ‘suture’ … is taken from psychoanalysis. Its explicit formulation is attributed to 
Jacques Alain-Miller … although it implicitly operates in the whole of Lacanian theory. It is used to designate the production of the subject 
on the basis of the chain of its discourse.”). See the discussion of “suture” in supra section B. V., “Structure / subject / suture”. 
172 Id. at 139.  
173 Id.   
174 Id. at 122-34.  
175 Id. at 129. See also Laclau, Identity and Hegemony, supra note 124, at 74 (“An always open intertextuality is the ultimately undecidable 
terrain in which hegemonic logics operate”).   
176 LACLAU AND MOUFFE, HEGEMONY, supra note 155, at 48.  
177 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 1. On sociology as “mother” and politics as “father” see supra section B. II., “Lacan and the 
Rat Man.” 
178 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 560-61 (paragraph break suppressed).  
179 Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration, 17 CAMBRIDGE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 197, 198 (2004).   
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My point, in tracing the origins of Koskenniemi’s argument for international legal practice as hegemony back to 
the original publication of From Apology in 1989, is that hegemony has been the foundation of Koskenniemi’s 
work from the beginning, and that it did not arrive as a mere add-on sometime around 2004. Beyond questions 
of timing, however, a more subtle and important point concerning Koskenniemi’s treatment of the relationship 
between hegemony and international law also needs to be made.   
 
Koskenniemi associates hegemony with “an argumentative practice in which particular subjects and values 
claim to represent that which is universal,”
180
 placing particular emphasis on the “objective[s] of the 
contestants,”
181
 on the arguments advanced by states,
182
 and on the notion that “[p]rofessional competence in 
international law is precisely about being able to identity the moment’s hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
narratives and to list one’s services in favour of one or the other.”
183
 Whilst he highlights international law’s 
function as “a hegemonic politics,”
184
 he does not present his argument as an argument for the hegemony of 
the international lawyer.  
 
Hegemony, as a form of political practice, is compatible with, even produced by, deconstruction (recalling 
Koskenniemi’s description of From Apology’s “approach” as “‘deconstructive’”).
185
 For Laclau, “deconstruction 
discovers the role of the decision out of the undecidability of the structure” – in our context, out of the fact 
that international law is neither “concrete”, nor “normative”, nor can it find and occupy a space between the 
two – with “hegemony as a theory of the decision taken in [the] undecidable terrain” that deconstruction 
unveils.
186
  
 
Through “deconstruction” Koskenniemi reveals “the contingent character of the connections existing in 
[international law’s] terrain.”
187
 He does this by, for example, showing that international legal doctrine on 
sovereignty and the sources of international law can be analysed with equal validity from opposing “ascending” 
and “descending” perspectives.
188
 “Deconstruction” creates the space for sutured international lawyers to 
make legal arguments qua political decisions.
189
 If the structure or discourse does not have the answer then 
international lawyers are free to make “contingent, precarious . . . pragmatic” political arguments within the 
discourse.
190
  
 
In making political decisions, in “aiming to act as . . . ‘genuine republican[s]’ encompassing the perspective of 
the whole,”
191
 international lawyers are “burden[ed] . . . with the impossible task of making [global] 
democratic interaction achievable.”
192
 They are “hegemonic” precisely because they are “not closed in a 
                                                 
180 Martti Koskenniemi, What is International Law For?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 29, 46 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 4d ed. 2014).  
181 Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 113, 119 (2005).  
182 Koskenniemi, A Reconfiguration, supra note 179.  
183 Koskenniemi, A Reconfiguration, supra note 179, at 202.  
184 Id. at 214.  
185 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 6-14.  
186 Laclau, Power, supra note 131, at 90. I disagree with Sahib Singh, International legal positivism and new approaches to international law, 
in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POSITIVISM IN A POST-MODERN WORLD 291, 296-97 (Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont eds., 2014), when he 
claims that KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, is a work of “structuralism” rather than “deconstruction,” insofar as he implies an 
either / or relationship between structuralism and deconstruction.  
187 Laclau, Power, supra note 131, at 90.  
188 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, 224-302, 303-87 (chapters 4 and 5).  
189 Laclau, Power, supra note 131, at 92 (“the structure is not fully reconciled with itself . . .  it is inhabited by an original lack  . . .  by a 
radical undecidability that needs to be constantly superseded by acts of decision”).   
190 Id. at 90.  
191 Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About International Law and Globalization, 8 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 9, 31 (2007).  
192 Ernesto Laclau, Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity, in ERNESTO LACLAU, EMANCIPATION(S) 20, 35 (2007).  
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narrow corporatist perspective,”
193
 not wholly apologetic for the current distribution of power, opportunity 
and wealth, “but [present themselves] as realizing the broader [utopian] aims either of emancipating or 
ensuring order for wider masses of the [global] population.”
194
 It is in this sense international lawyers are, 
collectively, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations,
195
 and, taking that as his title, Koskenniemi develops the argument 
for hegemonic practice further in his second book.  
II. Structuralism, Synchrony, and the “move to history” 
 
Koskenniemi tells us that Gentle Civilizer “move[s] from structure” – From Apology’s concern – “to history” 
through “intuitively plausible and politically engaged narratives about the emergence and gradual 
transformation of a profession that plays with the reader’s empathy,”
196
 and by “infus[ing] the study of 
international law with a sense of historical motion and political, even personal, struggle.”
197
 Another way to 
characterise the book would be to say that, consistent with From Apology’s concept of international law as a 
structure or discourse, Gentle Civilizer focuses on the “articulatory practice” of particular (sutured) subjects – 
Jellinek, Kelsen, Scelle, Lauterpacht,
198
 for example – and that this is “a story of kings . . . and the achievements 
of the great,”
199
 and quite deliberately not a story of the forgotten, ignored and marginalised.
200
 
 
Consistent with From Apology’s understanding of international law as a synchronic “language . . . a total system 
. . . complete at every moment, no matter what happens to have altered a moment ago,”
201
 we can read Gentle 
Civilizer’s various essays, on themes such as international legal practice in Germany in the period 1871-1933, as 
stories about past “kings”, past “gentle civilizers,” retold in order to “sharpen [the] . . . ability [of present day 
princes] to act in the professional contexts that are open to [them] as [they] engage in [or “suture” themselves 
into their] practices and projects.”
202
  
 
The book’s “move from structure to history” is synchronic;
203
 it is dictated by From Apology’s structuralist 
understanding of international law “as a language.”
204
 If, as Jameson maintains, Saussurean, structuralist 
linguistics is synchronic rather than diachronic then any account of international law’s history, built out of an 
                                                 
193 Ernesto Laclau, Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?, in ERNESTO LACLAU, EMANCIPATION(S) 36, 43 (2007). 
194 Id.   
195 KOSKENNIEMI, GENTLE CIVILIZER, supra note 6.  
196 Id. at 6, 10.  
197 Id. at 2.  
198 KOSKENNIEMI, GENTLE CIVILIZER, supra note 6, 198-208 (on Jellinek), 238-49 (on Kelsen), 327-38 (on Scelle), 353-412 (on Lauterpacht).   
199 FREDRIC JAMESON, THE ANTINOMIES OF REALISM 111 (2013) (on “the dynastic tradition of history writing and historical narrative, which was 
essentially a story of the kings and queens and the achievements of the great, that is to say individuals, who are grasped in our own spirit 
of the word as the protagonists of historical actions and narratives”).  
200 See KOSKENNIEMI, GENTLE CIVILIZER, supra note 6, at 9 (“If all the protagonists in this book are white men, for instance, that reflects my 
concern to retell the narrative of the mainstream as a story about its cosmopolitan sensibilities and political projects . . . This should not, 
however, be read so as to exclude the possibility – indeed, the likelihood – that in the margins . . .  there have been women and non-
Europeans whose stories would desperately require telling so as to provide a more complete image of the profession’s political heritage”).   
201 JAMESON, PRISON-HOUSE, supra note 1, at 5-6.   
202 Koskenniemi, GENTLE CIVILIZER, supra note 6, at 10. See also Matt Craven, Theorising the Turn to History in International Law, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21, 34 (Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann eds., 2016), rejecting diachrony as method:   
international law is not simply something that one can examine through the lens of history as if it were some historical 
artefact existing independently of the means chosen by which it is to be represented, but a field of practice whose 
meaning and significance is constantly organised around, and through the medium of, a discourse that links present to 
past.  
203 KOSKENNIEMI, GENTLE CIVILIZER, supra note 6, at 6.  
204 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 568.  
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understanding of international law “as a [synchronic] language,”
205
 will synchronise “individual events [in]to 
various manifestations of some basic idea . . . so that what at first seemed a series of events in time at length 
turns out to be a single timeless concept in the process of self-articulation.”
206
 Gentle Civilizer’s “single timeless 
concept” emerges out of the story of a May 1966 debate between Professors A.J. Thomas, Adolf Berle and 
Wolfgang Friedmann.
207
 In Koskenniemi’s hands the story is an allegory. Themes and tensions that permeate 
international law’s history play out in interactions between its characters, and Koskenniemi extracts a moral 
from it, using that moral to synchronise the individual essays into a coherent book.
208
  
 
The debate concerned the legality of US military intervention in the Dominican Republic. For Thomas “[t]he 
purpose of the rule against intervention [in a foreign state] was to protect ‘the liberty and self-determination of 
a people,’” values that could not be protected “[o]nce the communists control a government”.
209
 It followed 
that US military intervention was lawful, in particular because communist “infiltration” of the internal uprising 
amounted to an “armed attack.”
210
 Berle argued in favour of US military intervention despite the lack of UN 
Security Council authorisation or a credible self-defence argument,
211
 but Friedmann insisted that “there are 
norms of international law. If we wish to ignore them, then let us say frankly that international law is of no 
concern to us. But don’t let us pretend that we argue in terms of international law, when in fact we argue in 
terms of power or ideology.”
212
 
 
Koskenniemi maintains that Friedmann was “well aware of the shades of grey in all legal argumentation,”
213
 
well aware, recalling the discussion of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy above, of the contingent, articulatory 
nature of legal practice. Analysing Friedmann’s position, Koskenniemi emphasises that “differential [legal] 
positions” can be “articulated within,” but not outwith, “[the] discourse”:
214
  
 
Perhaps what Friedmann finds objectionable is the nonchalance with which Thomas and Berle 
treat his profession, the (to him) self-evident hypocrisy that accompanied their reasoning and 
                                                 
205 Id.  
206 JAMESON, PRISON-HOUSE, supra note 1, at 70.  
207 KOSKENNIEMI, GENTLE CIVILIZER, supra note 6, at 497-501.  
208 See FREDRIC JAMESON, THE ANTINOMIES, supra note 199. His observations on Alfred Döblin’s method, in his novel Wallenstein, seem equally 
applicable to Koskenniemi’s method, with money as Döblin’s moral and formalism as Koskenniemni’s: 
filled at every moment with names, with all the characters of history, some known, some only mentioned in passing: and 
with place names as well, not even the map is enough to accommodate them all. It is a pulsing interminable 
uninterrupted flow, true textuality (not mere form without content) in which everything is in perpetual change back and 
forth across Central Europe yet driving forward temporally so that time itself, the passing instants, become invisible, only 
the events are generated and they never stop, the writer never stops (he thereby disappears also), and the sources are so 
thoroughly used up that nothing is any more allusion . . . there can be no longer any competition with this unending flow 
of text but only the affect the pulses through it and changes color from pallor to flush . . . all the tonalities of the affective 
spectrum stream through the interminable moments, none of them truly fulfilled or effectuating any lasting pause or 
destiny . . . Not the least interest of this novel is indeed the recurrence in the form of an allegorical habit . . . Everything 
here . . . has to do with money, and with an immense coral polyp that refuses to starve or die away but keeps itself in life 
for unforeseeable years by the very strength with which it draws money out of its hiding place . . . Wealth then becomes 
the very conduit of energy itself.  
JAMESON, id., at 244-45.  
209 KOSKENNIEMI, GENTLE CIVILIZER, supra note 6, at 497 (quoting A.J. Thomas and Ann Van Wynen Thomas, The Dominican Republic Crisis 
1965. Legal Aspects, in A.J. THOMAS, ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & JOHN CAREY, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 3, 26-27 (1966)).  
210 Id.  
211 Id. at 497-98.    
212 Id. at 499 (quoting A.J. THOMAS, ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & JOHN CAREY, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 113 (1966)).  
213 Id.  
214 LACLAU AND MOUFFE, HEGEMONY, supra note 155, at 105.  
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that seemed to fatally undermine the profession’s faith and integrity. Indeed, it may have 
seemed to him that what Thomas and Berle were doing was not part of legal discourse at all.
215
  
 
Thomas and Berle break “the chain” that binds the subject to “its discourse,”
216
 and that break is the source of 
the objection Koskenniemi expresses allegorically through Friedmann.
217
 Friedmann is a “stand-in,” an ideal-
typical international lawyer qua sutured subject, who “take[s] the place” of the subject, the “profession,” 
within international law’s structure / discourse.
218
  
 
The allegory of the May 1966 debate is the “nodal point,” the “point de capiton,” of Gentle Civilizer and of 
Koskenniemi’s work as a whole.
219
 A collection of “privileged signifiers” – the arguments advanced by Thomas, 
Berle, and Friedmann – “[collectively] fix the meaning of [the] signifying chain” that runs through From Apology 
and Gentle Civilizer,
220
 “partially fix[ing] [the] meaning” of international legal practice in the process.
221
 For 
Koskenniemi, and under the banner of the “culture of formalism . . . the story of international law from Rolin to 
Friedmann” – from the foundation of the Institut de droit international in 1873 by Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns 
and the other “men of 1873” to Friedmann’s 1966 rejection of Thomas’ and Berle’s political pragmatism – 
“does have coherence.”
222
 It is the story of an attempt to serve, in the passé language of 1873, as “the ‘legal 
conscience . . . of the civilized world’”;
223
 of attempts to sustain “a practice that builds on formal arguments 
that are available to all under conditions of equality . . . insist[ing] that absent the possibility of building social 
life on unmediated love or universal reason, persuading people to bracket their own sensibilities and learn 
openness for others, is not worthless.”
224
  
 
“What at first seemed a series of events in time” – Gentle Civilizer’s apparently disparate historical essays – 
“turns out to be a single timeless concept in the process of self-articulation.”
225
 If the “culture of formalism” 
looked as though it had been articulated by Koskenniemi, if it looked like an “intellectual construction” 
produced out of “comparisons between one moment of lived time and another by someone who stands 
outside” international law,
226
 it would appear diachronic and lose the quality of seeming internal to 
international law’s discourse. By apparently emerging out of “a series of events in time” at the end of Gentle 
Civilizer, the “culture of formalism” seems to articulate itself. Crucially, however, behind this “self-articulation” 
                                                 
215 KOSKENNIEMI, GENTLE CIVILIZER, supra note 6, at 499.  
216 Miller, supra note 128, at 93.  
217 Koskenniemi’s objection, via Friedmann, to Thomas and Berle seems to echo Freud in the sense captured by Caudill, supra note 14, at 
661 (“Freud believed that the primordial and dangerous passions of the individual must be controlled by inherently oppressive social 
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lurks Koskenniemi’s a priori preference, expressed (covertly) in From Apology, for the synchronic over the 
diachronic. “[T]he decision as to whether one faces a break or a continuity,”
227
 the choice between synchrony 
and diachrony, between “whether the present is to be seen as a historical originality or as the simply 
prolongation of more of the same under different sheep’s clothing,”
228
 is pure rather than “empirically 
justifiable or philosophically arguable . . . since it is itself the inaugural narrative act that grounds the 
perception and interpretation of the events to be narrated.”
229
 If the choice between synchrony and diachrony 
is not “justifiable” then, methodologically, the best course of action is to use the fabric of the text to cover over 
the fact that you have chosen one over the other. To do this the text must be structured so as to make your 
choice seem natural and uncontroversial. This explains why the “culture of formalism” appears to articulate 
itself and why, despite being Koskenniemi’s core message, he only introduces it at the end of his second book. 
 
Gentle Civilizer does not, then, “move from structure to history,”
230
 insofar as that implies an opposition 
between structure and history. The book is, rather, a structuralist-synchronic history of international law, and it 
needs to be read as such.
231
 I will return to the possibility of choosing diachrony over synchrony as the 
foundation of an alternative theory of international law and its practice in the final part of this article. For now, 
I simply want to emphasise the fact a choice between synchrony and diachrony exists.  
III. “Empty” Universalism   
 
The “culture of formalism” is an argument for an “‘empty’ . . . negative” universalism that “avoids the danger of 
imperialism” by being ‘recognisable . . . only in terms of its opposition to something that it is not.”
232
 Whilst 
“Thomas and Berle saw politics as a clash of incompatible particularities – ‘identity politics’ . . . Friedmann kept 
open the space for something beyond the merely particular,”
233
 for an “empty” universalism.  
 
Koskenniemi derives his non-imperialist, “empty”, formal universalism from Laclau,
234
 and it recurs throughout 
his work.
235
 For Laclau hegemony is a political practice in pursuit of an unrealisable universal. The process of 
Italian unification that began in the nineteenth century, for example, is not so much a “concrete political 
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programme” as “the name or . . . symbol of a lack,”
 236
 and the process is capable of sustaining Italian politics 
“over a period of centuries ” because it is built around that “constitutive lack” 
237
  
 
Hegemonic practices are attempts to resolve “the openness of the social,” “to fill in” or “suture” fractures in 
the social fabric.
238
 Because “a closure of the social is . . . impossible” hegemonic practices are more attempts 
than achievements,
239
 efforts to articulate ways in which society might be changed without any real prospect 
that this will achieve a “totally sutured society . . . where this filling-in would have reached its ultimate 
consequences.”
240
  
 
Koskenniemi uses formalism as a euphemism for hegemony. He presents his argument for international legal 
practice as hegemony in the abstract,
241
 in the footnotes.
242
 The term “formalism” seems somehow more 
consonant with international legal discourse than “hegemony,” more consistent with the suture between the 
international lawyer and his discourse.
243
  
 
The hegemonic practice of international law within international legal discourse sustains the “authentic[ity]” 
and “integrity” of international law,
244
 creating “a continuity operating through partial discontinuities” that 
counterbalances “the openness of the social” by keeping the fractures,
245
 the “fissure[s],”
246
 within 
manageable bounds. For Koskenniemi international law’s value, as a hegemonic practice, does not lie in any 
particular achievement or track-record of success but in its status as an open, “empty” space of articulation in 
which “the common good of humankind [is] not reducible to the good of any particular institution . . . ‘regime’ 
[or particularity]”:
247
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international law’s formalism . . . brings political antagonists together as they invoke contrasting 
understandings of its rules and institutions. In the absence of agreement over, of knowledge of, 
the “true” objectives of political community – that is to say, in an agnostic world – the pure form 
of international law provides the shared surface – the only such surface – on which political 
adversaries recognize each other as such and pursue their adversity in terms of something 
shared, instead of seeking to gain full exclusion – “outlawry” – of the other. In this sense, 
international law’s value and its misery lie in its being the fragile surface of political community 
among social agents . . .  who disagree about their preferences but do this within a structure that 
invites them to argue in terms of an assumed universality.
248
 
 
So conceived, “law becomes a partial cure for the traumas of society, in a fashion not dissimilar to that applied 
to individuals in therapy.”
249
 If psychoanalysis is a talking therapy then international law, for Koskenniemi, is a 
“speaking” therapy,
250
 a way of articulating some-things after we (international lawyers) have realised that we 
cannot articulate every-thing, that we have been (metaphorically) castrated.
251
  
 
IV. Necessity / Impossibility / “three endeavours” 
Building on the discussion thus far, this section considers the place of what Laclau describes as “the double 
condition of necessity and impossibility” in Koskenniemi’s work.
252
 
 
Laclau explores the formal “necessity” of pursuing the concretely “impossible” through  hegemony by outlining 
“three endeavours,” each central to the construction of “hegemonic articulatory logics.”
253
 My aim in this 
section is to show that Koskenniemi engages in each of these endeavours in pursuit of an “intellectual strategy” 
that is designed to establish,
254
 first, that international law is a Laclauian discourse and second, that the making 
of international legal arguments involves, and throughout its history has involved, “articulatory practice” by 
sutured subjects. 
 
The first “endeavour” involves “understand[ing] the logics by which each of the two dimensions [necessity and 
impossibility] subverts the other.”
255
 From Apology understands the “subvert[ing]” relationship between 
necessity and impossibility in international law through the political / “normativity” vs. sociological / 
“concreteness” opposition. Whilst it may appear necessary for international law to find and occupy a space 
between these two domains, a “specifically ‘legal’ discourse,”
256
 finding and occupying that space is impossible. 
The impossibility of finding that space does not, however, make the search for it unnecessary. The search itself 
may be the product of the “myth” of a “specifically ‘legal’ discourse” but the fact that the search is mythical 
does not mean that international law can stop searching. Whilst, therefore, “intellectual operations [which 
seek to distinguish international law from the sociological and the political] do not leave room for any 
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specifically legal discourse,”
257
 “[t]he structure of international legal argument” is defined by the “dynamics of 
[the] contradiction” between “normativity” and “concreteness.”
258
  
 
This leads into the second of Laclau’s “endeavours,” which involves “look[ing] at the political productivity of 
[the] mutual subversion [of necessity and impossibility] – that is, what it makes possible to understand about 
the working of our societies which goes beyond what is achievable by unilateralizing either of the two poles.”
259
 
International law needs to be understood as a “grammar,” 
260
 as a “discourse,” 
261
 rather than as a “specifically 
‘legal’ discourse,”
262
 precisely because finding and occupying the space “between the sociological and the 
political” is a necessary impossibility and an impossible necessity.
263
 That the occupation of such a space is 
impossible does not mean that the idea of that space is not existentially necessary to international law qua 
discourse. Equally, the fact that the search for that space is necessary to the discourse of international law does 
not make it possible to actually find that space.  
 
It is in this sense that international law lives with(in) its neurosis, with(in) a search for a “specifically ‘legal’ 
discourse” that is as necessary as it is futile. International law “get[s] over” its neurosis,
264
 and lives within its 
myth, by recognising the necessary impossibility and the impossible necessity of the search – a move, as 
discussed above, that From Apology argues for – but that does not abolish the myth or cure the neurosis.  
 
The idea of a “specifically ‘legal ‘discourse” is a mythical “constitutive lack” at the heart of international law;
265
 
something that constitutes and structures the discourse by its absence. It designates a gap in the structure of 
the discourse which cannot be sutured by hegemonic, “articulatory practice,” but which creates the space for 
that practice. Abolishing the myth of a “specifically ‘legal’ discourse” or ending the neurotic search for 
sociological and political validation would abolish the “constitutive lack” and, consequently, destroy 
international legal discourse qua discourse.  
 
The “constitutive lack” of a place “between the sociological and the political” in From Apology translates into 
the “empty” universalism of Gentle Civilizer because hegemonic, “articulatory practice” within a discourse is 
incompatible with any concrete, universal programme:  
It is only as long as the ideal social order remains formal that it can accommodate autonomy and 
community and be acceptable. Immediately as it is given concrete content – as soon as it 
becomes a programme of what to do – it will appear to overrule somebody’s preferred 
substantive view and seem illegitimate as such.
266
  
 
This is consistent which Laclau’s Italian unification example, quoted above.
267
 Hegemonic “formalism projects 
the universal community as a standard – but always an unachieved one,”
268
 because:  
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[t]he fullness of society is an impossible object which successive contingent contents try to 
impersonate through catachrestical displacements. This is exactly what hegemony means. And it 
is also the source of whatever freedom can exist in society: no such freedom would be possible if 
the ‘fullness’ of society had reached its ‘true’ ontic form.
269
  
 
The third “endeavour” involves “trac[ing] the genealogy of this undecidable logic [between necessity and 
impossibility], the way it was already subverting the central texts of our political and philosophical tradition.”
270
 
From Apology “trace[s] the genealogy of [the] undecidable logic” of necessity and impossibility, mapping the 
interaction between necessary, “ascending,” concrete, apologetic and impossible, “descending,” utopian 
arguments across the core “categories of classical” international legal thought,
271
 from  “[s]overeignty” to 
“[s]ources” and “[c]ustom.”
272
 From Apology “[conceives] of [those “categories”] . . . as objects presupposed by 
hegemonic articulatory logics.”
273
 It does not “flat[ly] reject” them because of their “undecidable logic”,
274
 
because they can be approached with equal validity from “ascending” and “descending” perspectives. It treats 
each category as an aspect of a discourse that is structured so as to demand articulatory, hegemonic decision-
making by its practitioners.  
 
Gentle Civilizer, likewise, “trace[s] the genealogy of [the] undecidable logic” of “the culture of formalism.” 
Perhaps Hersch Lauterpacht’s early to mid-twentieth century moderate, “modernist,” “utopian federalism” 
was, ultimately, just a bit too utopian,
275
 and perhaps it is no longer possible to “ha[ve] no doubt about the 
universal and intrinsically beneficent character of legal reason.”
276
 But, for Koskenniemi, that does not mean 
that Lauterpacht’s “Victorian tradition” of “political commitment” and a “consistent attempt to maintain, 
through projection, the wholeness of a social world and [a] personal identity” lacks contemporary relevance.
277
 
And perhaps Hans Kelsen, by cutting law off from “its relationship to the surrounding world,”
278
 went too far in 
his attempts to establish a “pure theory” but, for Koskenniemi, that does not mean that his efforts can be 
ignored or dismissed: “Since Kelsen, lawyers have looked for professional identity in a middle ground between 
that which is sociological description (of what works) and that which is moral speculation (of what would be 
good).”
279
  
 
Gentle Civilizer argues that international law is, and always has been, an “undecidable,” unsuturable logic – a 
Laclauian discourse – whose future depends, and always has depended, on subjects suturing themselves into 
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the discourse and making political choices through hegemonic, “articulatory practice.”
280
 It makes that 
argument through a synchronic history of the discipline; a history that tells the discipline what it now is by 
explaining how it has always been this way.   
 
The aim, in this section, has been to demonstrate the Laclauian character of Koskenniemi’s argument. This 
moves us closer to the core argument of this article – that Koskenniemi’s work can and should be read as a 
Lacanian psychoanalysis of international law(yers) – but, to demonstrate the ultimate dependence of 
Koskenniemi’s Laclau-inspired argument for the hegemony of the international lawyer on Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory, the relationship between Laclau and Lacan needs to be addressed directly.  
 
V. Laclau and Lacan … and Koskenniemi  
 
Lacan’s political theory of hegemony is largely based on Laclau’s psychoanalytic theory.
281
 Like Lacan, Laclau 
insists on the “primacy of the signifier.”
282
 Language and “articulation” are the focus of hegemonic politics 
because they are the means by which our social reality is formed: “The bar in the relation S/s is the very 
precondition of a primacy of the signifier without which hegemonic displacements would be inconceivable.”
283
  
 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and Laclauian “hegemonic analysis” are concerned with truth rather than meaning,
284
 
whilst insisting on the unachievability of any fixed truth:  
 
The ultimate point which makes an exchange between Lacanian theory and the hegemonic 
approach to politics possible and fruitful is that in both cases, any kind of unfixity, tropic 
displacement, and so on, is organized around an original lack which, while it imposes an extra 
duty on all processes of representation – they have to represent not just a determinate ontic 
content but equally the principle of representability as such – also, as this dual task cannot but 
ultimately fail in achieving the suture it attempts, opens the way to a series of indefinite 
substitutions which are the very ground of a radical historicism.
285
 
 
The foundations of Laclau’s political theory of hegemony lie in Lacanian psychoanalysis. The truth of any 
subjectivity – the truth of who or how someone, like the Rat Man, is – is understood through the structure in 
which they were formed and into which they have been “sutured.” That structure exists in language, in the 
signification of roles or qualities – wife / mother / sociology / concreteness / apology, or father / politics / 
friend / lover / normativity / utopia – and the recounting of stories about a father’s gambling, a mother’s 
riches, or a May 1966 debate in New York. 
 
The aim of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Laclauian hegemonic politics is not to reconstruct the present out of 
the past (diachrony) but to explain the possibilities of present action within pre-formed structures (synchrony). 
Psychoanalysis cannot “perfect” the Rat Man’s life, and we cannot uncastrate ourselves, but we can shed 
“light” on our situation and find progressive ways to act if we psychoanalyze our situation, our structural 
position.
286
 Hegemony, in this sense, is a psychoanalytic-structuralist theory of political praxis. 
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Koskenniemi’s message is that an understanding of the structures which condition and create the subjectivity 
of the international lawyer can secure the future of international legal practice, just as an appreciation of the 
reasons for his neurotic behaviour – his elaborate scheme to repay the debt – makes it possible for the Rat 
Man to continue with his life. An accommodation with or understanding of your structure as your structure 
guarantees continued life (within the structure), and, in this sense, the future of international law depends on 
synchronisation with its past.
287
  
VI. The Psychoanalysis of International Law  
 
Summarising the analysis and argument thus far, Koskennieni’s work should be read as a psychoanalysis of 
international law / the international lawyer because, by applying Laclau’s Lacanian political theory of 
hegemony, described by Laclau and Mouffe in terms of the maintenance of a coherent, modernist political 
practice in the turbulence of the post-Cold War era,
288
 it keeps the “modernist . . . charismatic,”
289
 quasi-
“heroi[c]” international lawyer alive despite his / international law’s near-fatal contradictions, flaws and 
anxieties.
290
 It does this without curing his neurosis, and without resolving the fundamental contradictions in 
international law’s basic structure, just as psychoanalysis kept the Rat Man alive without uncastrating him / his 
father (see section B. II., “Lacan and the Rat Man”).  
 
For some international lawyers it may be enough that they are (professionally) alive.
291
 I disagree. Maybe I, 
qua international legal academic, have suicidal tendencies,
292
 a “death instinct,”
293
 but my point, 
foreshadowed in the introduction and developed in the final part of this article, is that it is time to euthanize 
the image of the modernist international lawyer qua quasi-hero that Koskenniemi has kept alive. Before 
developing this argument, however, one final, fundamental question about the relationship between 
Koskenniemi’s work and Lacan needs to be addressed.  
                                                                                                                                                        
and arrogant, but also . . .  a truer and more ethical subject”); Jacques Lacan, Discourse analysis and ego analysis, in THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES 
LACAN: BOOK I, FREUD’S PAPERS ON TECHNIQUE 1953-1954 62, 67 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., John Forrester trans., 1988) (“Nothing other than 
this is at stake in analysis – recognising what function the subject takes on in the order of the symbolic relations which covers the entire 
field of human relations”); Koskenniemi, Celebrating Structuralism, supra note 241, at 728 (“One type of ‘structural’ analysis that arose in 
the twentieth century aimed to make explicit the rules of production of . . . ‘there-ness’, the sense in which we end up feeling that 
something is so ‘true’ that we allow it to determine the way we live. According to this type of analysis, of which [From Apology] is a 
specimen, learning to know how such ‘truths’ are produced would release us of their power so as to take action in order to deal with 
problems that otherwise seemed intractable (because they were based on ‘truths’) and allows us to lead in some sense better lives”).  
287 See Martti Koskenniemi, Histories of International Law: Significance and Problems for a Critical View, 27 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 215, 
216 (2013) (“what seems needed is a better understanding of how we have come to where we are now”). See also id. at 238 (“The turn to 
contextual readings of international law marks a welcome advance from the older search for origins and the progressive accounting of 
international doctrines that accompanied traditional histories . . . Nevertheless, there was something valuable in the sweeping normativity 
of older histories, in the way they sought to produce “lessons” from their narratives. A careful reconstruction of the context cannot be all. 
Critical history must also examine how those contexts were formed and to what extent they have persisted to make the world into what it 
has become today”). On the importance of tradition and the passage of time in international law see Nicholson, supra note 20.  
288 LACLAU AND MOUFFE, HEGEMONY, supra note 155, at vii-xix.  
289 JAMESON, PRISON-HOUSE, supra note 1, at 306.  
290 Koskenniemi, Between Commitment and Cynicism, supra note 90, at 497 (“a commitment, distinguished from mere “work”, has an 
aspect of heroism in that it works against all odds”).  
291 See Caudill, supra note 14, at 661 (noting that a Freudian psychoanalytic perspective “may be helpful in social analysis . . . [but] invite[s] 
pessimism and provides the basis for an implied conservatism rather than for a radical or utopian critique of the status quo”).  
292 See Jon Mills, Reflections on the Death Drive, 23 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY 373, 375 (2006) (“A logical claim can be advanced that life is 
only possible through the force of the negative that brings about higher developmental achievements through the destruction of the 
old . . . Psychoanalysts are often confused by viewing death as merely a physical end-state or the termination of life, when it may be 
memorialized in the psyche as a primary ontological principle that informs the trajectory of all psychic activity” (footnote omitted)).  
293Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD VOLUME 
XVIII (1920-1922) 7, at 38-41, 44, 46-47, 49-57, 60 (James Strachey trans., 1955) (1920). See also SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS 55 (James Strachey ed., Joan Riviere trans., 1982) (“besides the instinct to preserve living substance and to join it into ever 
larger units, there must exist another, contrary instinct seeking to dissolve those units and to bring them back to the primaeval, inorganic 
state. That is to say, as well as Eros there was an instinct of death”).    
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VII.   Reality Affects and the “lack” of Lacan  
 
That final and fundamental question is this: How is it possible to read Koskenniemi’s work as a Lacanian 
psychoanalysis of international law, as this article has, given: (i) the lack of Lacan’s name in Koskenniemi’s texts, 
and; (ii) the absence of deliberate concealment by Koskenniemi of Lacan’s place in his work (which I am not 
suggesting)?  
 
Lacan provides the answer to (i): “every discourse derives its effects from the unconscious.”
294
 Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is, in Jameson’s terms, the “political unconscious” of Koskenniemi’s work, its “hidden master 
narrative” and the “hidden narrative” of its “master” (Koskenniemi).
295
 It is because Lacan is an “unconscious” 
presence, a “constitutive lack” – someone present in Koskenniemi’s texts for all that (the reader thinks) he is 
not there – that Koskenniemi’s work has been so “effect[ive].”  
 
To tell international law / international lawyers that it / they are being psychoanalyzed – to reveal that in the 
text, rather than concealing it in the subtext – would make the whole exercise ineffectual.
296
 It / they may not, 
after all, consent to the analysis and, even if it / they did, they may not want to read the analyst’s report. 
Without telling it / him what he is doing, the analyst / master “initiates the one still in ignorance into the 
dimension of fundamental . . . relationships” through psychoanalysis by “open[ing] . . . what one might call the 
way to moral consciousness.”
297
 He shows the analysand / patient the structure within which he exists through 
a process of “self-articulation” (on “self-articulation” see section C. II., “Structuralism, synchrony and the 
‘move to history’”) in which the analysand / patient self-articulates their structure as their structure (see 
section B. II., “Lacan and the Rat Man”), suturing themselves into it in the process (see II E., “Structure / 
subject / suture,” above).
298
  
 
Koskenniemi’s process of “showing” rather than “telling” produces a reality “affect”;
299
 it affect-ively makes 
the image of international law and the (sutured) identity of the international lawyer it produces and advocates 
– commitment to hegemonic practice within a linguistic structure, the “culture of formalism” – seem (really) 
real, seem more than the (mere) image or “fiction” it (really) is.
300
 In The Antinomies of Realism Fredric 
Jameson considers the production of reality “affect” as a technique or style in literary realism associated, in 
                                                 
294 Lacan, Subversion, supra note 63, at 701.  
295 JAMESON, POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 24, at 13.  
296 See id. at 68.  
297 Lacan, Myth, supra note 47, at 407-8.  
298 The necessity of “self-articulation” and self-suturing – of showing the international lawyer his structure rather than telling him about it 
– explains why Koskenniemi does not adopt Jason Beckett’s position and insist on formalism as “the only competent way in which 
[international law] may be spoken or practiced.” Beckett, supra note 9, at 1079.  
299 JAMESON, THE ANTINOMIES OF REALISM, supra note 199, at 21-26 (on “showing” and “telling”), 36, 70 (on “affect”).  
300 According to Jameson:  
 
we must think our way back into a situation in which th[e] question [of fiction / non-fiction] makes no sense and in 
which . . . the distinction between fiction and nonfiction (or history) does not yet obtain . . . postmodernity as such has 
now rendered those distinctions obsolete 
 
 JAMESON, THE ANTINOMIES OF REALISM, supra note 199, at 253. Jameson also observes:  
 
In the postmodern, where the original no longer exists and everything is an image, there can no longer be any question 
either of the accuracy or truth of representation . . . where the true is ontologically absent, there can be nothing false or 
fictive either: such concepts no longer apply to a world of simulacra, where only the names – Lacan’s “points de 
capiton” . . . – remain. 
 
Id. at 293. See also Lacan, Subversion, supra note 63, at 684 (“Thus Truth draws its guarantee from somewhere other than the 
Reality it concerns: it draws it from Speech. Just as it is from Speech that Truth receives the mark that instates it in a fictional 
structure”); Jacques Lacan, Psychoanalysis and Its Teaching, in JACQUES LACAN, ÉCRITS 364, 376 (Bruce Fink trans., 2006) (on 
“facticity” and the notion that “the truth brings out its fictional structure”).   
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particular, and not without relevance for international law given the foundation of the Institut de Droit 
International in 1873 and the significance that Koskenniemi attaches to that event in Gentle Civilizer (see 
section C. II., “Structuralism, synchrony and the ‘move to history’”), with “nineteenth-century realism.”
301
  
 
For Jameson “the realm of affect” involves “the ‘insurrection of the present against other temporalities.’”
302
 
The synchronic manifests this “insurrection” in its prioritisation of the present, of “the immediate lived 
experience of the native speaker,” over the diachronic’s emphasis on “comparisons between one moment of 
lived time and another” (see section B. III, “International law ‘as a language”’). Koskenniemi’s synchronic 
methodology, analysed throughout this article, can therefore be seen to exist within “the realm of affect.”   
 
“Affect” itself is “resistan[t] . . . to language,” “a fleeting essence.”
303
Affects are “nameless and 
unclassifiable”;
304
 anything that “means something” is not an affect.
305
 Affects are not “emotions” because 
“emotion is preeminently a phenomenon sorted out into an array of names” and names have “reifying effects” 
that turn sensations into named things.
306
 Affects are “characterized . . . in terms of physical sensation or 
sensory perception.”
307
An affect is a “representational presence,”
308
 something which cannot be told or 
defined, something that is made real through representation and being shown. “At its outer limit, affect 
becomes the organ of perception of the world itself, the vehicle of my being-in-the-world,”
309
 an image of 
international law as “pure form.”
310
 
 
Koskenniemi’s work, from From Apology through Gentle Civilizer and beyond, is an exercise in producing a 
reality “affect.”
311
 That affect cannot be defined or captured in concepts or names but we come close to a 
direct encounter with it in the notion of the “culture of formalism.” Because it shows the reader the “culture of 
formalism” in practice, the allegorical story of the May 1966 debate between Thomas, Berle and Friedmann is, 
in my view, the “nodal point,” the “point de capiton” of Koskenniemi’s work (on which see section C. II., 
“Structuralism, synchrony and the ‘move to history’”); the single most important story or “element” in 
Koskenniemi’s work.
312
   
 
An affective methodology is closely related to the Lacanian concept of “the real, or what is perceived as such, 
[as] . . . [that which] resists symbolisation absolutely.”
313
 The nature of “affect,” and of the Lacanian “real,” is 
                                                 
301 JAMESON, THE ANTINOMIES OF REALISM, supra note 199, at 35.  
302 Id. at 10 (quoting and translating the title of ALEXANDER KLUGE, DER ANGRIFF DER GEGENWART GEGEN DIE ÜBRIGE ZEIT (1985)).  
303 Id. at 31.  
304 Id. at 33.  
305 Id. at 33.  
306 Id. at 30.  
307 Id. at 35.  
308 Id. at 35.  
309 Id. at 43.  
310 Koskenniemi, What is International Law For?, supra note 180, at 48.  
311 Koskenniemi makes a point about reality affects in relation to Philip Allott’s work:  
 
[The] style simultaneously affirms and erases the authorial voice . . . A few lines of this text and every international lawyer 
will know who has written them. Erasure: but it is a voice that denies its own personality and seeks to rise above anything 
as superficial or flimsy as authorial. Where Roland Barthes famously analysed the effet de réel in literature, the power of 
the literary style – the style of ‘realism’ – to create the impression that reality itself spoke, Philip uses an effet d’histoire – 
an effect as if history itself were speaking in his writing. 
 
Martti Koskenniemi, International Law as Therapy: Reading the Health of Nations, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 329, 333 (2005).  
312 See LACLAU AND MOUFFE, HEGEMONY, supra note 155, at 105 (“element”).  
313 Lacan, Discourse analysis and ego analysis, supra note 286, at 66. See also Macey, supra note 73, at xxvi (“the real . . . is not 
synonymous with external reality, but refers to the residual dimension that constantly resists symbolism and signification”).    
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such that you cannot (effectively) tell international lawyers who or what they real-ly, unconsciously are – you 
cannot symbolise or name them – but you can (affectively) show them.  
 
That, in my view, is what Koskenniemi has done. His work shows that the reality of international law is an 
“affect” of its form but, precisely because it is an “affect,” you cannot (formally) tell anyone that.
314
 His inquiry 
into “the real” of international law, into its “deep-structure,”
315
 works on the basis of the production of reality 
“affects.” It has to show rather than tell because, as noted above, the real “resists symbolisation absolutely.” 
The reality “affect” that it produces is a “pure form,”
316
 a “vehicle of . . . being-in-the-world,” 
317
 qua 
international legal form(alism). 
 
International lawyers who refuse to accept Koskenniemi’s analysis, who remain immune to its reality “affect,” 
are, apparently, mistaken. They do not understand themselves: “les non-dupes errant” / ‘“those who are not 
taken in err.”’
318
 Because they “are not taken in,” not “affected,” not “committed” to (formal) international 
law above all else, Thomas’ and Berle’s contributions to the May 1966 debate are mistaken (see section C. II., 
“Structuralism, Synchrony, and the ‘move to history’”). Similarly, “activists” who prioritise the pursuit of 
political causes through legal argument over their commitment to international law itself are, apparently, not 
real lawyers.
319
    
 
The “political” (Jameson’s term) “effect” (Lacan’s term) of Koskenniemi’s psychoanalysis “derives” (Lacan’s 
term) from its production of a reality “affect” (Jameson’s term),
320
 from the fact that it is done “unconsciously” 
(both Lacan and Jameson focus on the “unconscious”), and via “show” rather than “tell.” If “there is nothing 
that is not social and historical” and if “everything is ‘in the last analysis’ political” then Koskenniemi’s attempt 
to synchronise the history and present of international law, in a project designed to affectively delimit 
international law’s form, is “political.”
321
 It achieves political effect – it influences the polity’s self-
consciousness – by producing a reality “affect.” Ultimately, “the power of [Koskenniemi’s] text[s], with [their] 
hidden assumptions, lies in a suppression of [their] mode of production not unlike the ego’s repression of its 
own self-constructive processes.”
322
 
 
Characterising the master’s / analyst’s process as a “political” move in which the patient / analysand is shown 
the benefits of psychoanalysis without consenting to it may seem to contradict my claim (in (ii), at the start of 
this section) that Koskenniemi has not deliberately concealed Lacan’s influence in his work. To overcome this 
apparent contradiction, we need to consider the links between Koskenniemi’s, David Kennedy’s and Duncan 
Kennedy’s work.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
314 See Haskell, supra note 29, at 667 (2016) (noting “[t]he irony . . .  that while unquestionably a profoundly important text that bring to 
light central historical, methodological and theoretical problems confronting the discipline, it often does so inadvertently – in other words, 
it is exactly how these problems are circumvented, obscured, silenced in the text that brings them into focus” (footnote omitted)); Singh, 
The Critic(al) Subject, supra note 14, at 14 (“From Apology to Utopia presumed into existence the type of psychological and social subject 
that was desired and required by its author’s politics . . . without being seen to do so”).  
315 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 6.  
316 Koskenniemi, What is International Law For?, supra note 180, at 48.  
317 JAMESON, THE ANTINOMIES OF REALISM, supra note 199, at 43.  
318 See text accompanying supra notes 2 and 3.  
319 Koskenniemi, Between Commitment and Cynicism, supra note 90, at 518-21. Compare Rajagopal, supra note 22.  
320 JAMESON, POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 24; Lacan, Subversion, supra note 63, at 701; JAMESON, THE ANTINOMIES OF REALISM, supra note 
199, 36, 70 (on “affect”).  
321 JAMESON, POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 24, at 5  
322 Caudill, supra note 14, at 673.  
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1. “Theses,” “Commentaries,” and Apologies  
 
In his 1980 “Theses about International Law Discourse” David Kennedy outlined an “analytic approach” to 
international law,
323
 a “style that could be labelled structuralist because it seeks to explain the current pattern 
of discourse and commentary and the interconnectedness of both doctrinal areas and conceptual schools by 
reference to their underlying structures.”
324
 Kennedy notes that this “style” is based in part on Saussure’s 1966 
Course in General Linguistics and Levi-Strauss’s 1966 The Savage Mind,
325
 two works that Koskenniemi 
references when explaining that From Apology takes a similarly “analytic approach,” “argu[ing] . . . ‘backwards’ 
from explicit arguments to their ‘deep-structure.’”
326
 Neither Kennedy nor Koskenniemi subjects these major 
works to analysis, simply referring to them in footnotes.
327
  
 
For Kennedy “international legal scholarship is in crisis” because “as the practice of international law has 
expanded, it seems to have become weaker.”
328
 This “crisis” and weakness are caused by “a conflict between 
the autonomy and cooperation of states,”
329
 reflecting what David Kennedy and Duncan Kennedy label “[t]he 
fundamental contradiction” between individual freedom and collective, social life.
330
 David Kennedy uses the 
term as a shorthand for the “basic quandary” in which the interests of “individual nations” and “other 
sovereigns” conflict,
331
 acknowledging the origin of the concept in Duncan Kennedy’s 1979 article “The 
Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries,”
 332 
whilst Duncan Kennedy uses it as shorthand for the fact “that 
relations with others are both necessary to and incompatible with our freedom.”
333
 “Blackstone’s 
Commentaries” outlines “a method for understanding the political significance of legal thinking, a method that 
might be called structuralist or phenomenological, or neo-Marxist, or all three together,”
334
 setting up a 
tension between ideas of law as “an instrument of apology” and “a utopian enterprise.”
335
 Legal analysis is, so 
the argument goes, inspired by a “utopian” motive which tries “to discover the conditions of social justice” yet 
simultaneously driven by an apologism that seeks to explain why things are and will remain the way they 
are.
336
 
 
David Kennedy’s “Theses” translates Duncan Kennedy’s analytical approach to “American legal thought” for an 
international legal audience.
337
 International legal discourse’s “fundamental contradiction” has a “binary” 
structure: “there are two mutually exclusive possibilities which never exist without each other.”
338
 The 
                                                 
323 David Kennedy, Theses about International Law Discourse, 23 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INT’L L. 353, 354  (1980).  
324 Id. at 355 (footnote 4).   
325 Id. at 355. 
326 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 6.  
327 See David Kennedy, Theses, supra note 323, at 355; KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 6, 8.  
328 Id. at 356. 
329 Id. at 362.  
330 David Kennedy, Theses, supra note 323, at 361; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 213 
(1979).  
331 David Kennedy, Theses, supra note 323, at 361.  
332 Id. (footnote 9); Duncan Kennedy, Blackstone’s Commentaries, supra note 330. 
333 Duncan Kennedy, Blackstone’s Commentaries, supra note 332, at 213.  
334 Id. at 209.  
335 Id. at 210.  
336 Id. (“an instrument of apology  an attempt to mystify both dominators and dominated by convincing them of the ‘naturalness’, the 
‘freedom’ and the ‘rationality’ of a condition of bondage’).  
337 Id. at 209.  
338 David Kennedy, Theses, supra note 323, at 364.  
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“contradiction” is also “transformational” in the sense that “positions . . . are connected in a particular way” 
with “[e]ach pole of the binary opposition seem[ing] to contain its opposite in some sense.”
339
   
 
This “binary,” “transformational” analysis is echoed in Koskenniemi’s apology / utopia analytic, something he 
acknowledges in a footnote: “I have received the theme apology / utopia from [David Kennedy’s “Theses”] . . . 
article.”
340
 In another footnote he highlights the importance of “Blackstone’s Commentaries” as “the most 
influential” work on “[t]he strategy of ‘revealing’ contradictions within legal argument and tracing them back 
to more fundamental distortions in our ways to conceptualise human nature and social life,” without 
specifically highlighting the (apparent) origin of From Apology’s title in Duncan Kennedy’s article.
341
  
 
Whilst the connection between Koskenniemi’s, David Kennedy’s and Duncan Kennedy’s work is well charted in 
the literature,
342
 the significance of that connection has not, to date, been fully articulated. Forensic analysis of 
the connections between the key texts (“Theses,” “Blackstone’s Commentaries,” From Apology) and related 
works by their authors is required to remedy this.   
 
That analysis starts with recognition that From Apology is not only connected to David Kennedy’s ‘Theses’; it 
picks Kennedy’s project up where he left off, continuing it and adopting his methodology. In From Apology’s 
introduction Koskenniemi outlines a “deconstructive” methodology based on Saussure’s work which he then 
develops into an account of international law as a “discourse.”
343
 This reflects David Kennedy’s argument, 
supported with reference to Levi-Strauss and Saussure,
344
 that “concentration upon discourse and upon the 
hidden ideologies, attitudes and structures which lie behind discourse, rather than upon the subject matter of 
legal talk” is required.
345
  
 
Kennedy maintains that “good arguments do not resolve the questions posed by legal cases;”
346
 Koskenniemi 
“[t]hat there is no real discourse going on within legal argument . . .  but only a patterned exchange of 
argument.”
347
 For Kennedy “[o]ne may imagine law to be either critical of or grounded in state behaviour, and 
neither understanding of law is sufficient;”
348
 for Koskenniemi “international legal discourse cannot fully 
accept either of the justificatory patterns [“ascending” or “descending,” “concrete” or “normative]” and it 
therefore produces “an incoherent argument which constantly shifts between the opposing positions whilst 
remaining open to challenge from the opposite argument.” 
349
  
 
For Kennedy “practitioners . . . must act as though their discourse should be convincing without actually 
believing that they would be convinced were they to hear themselves;” 
350
 for Koskenniemi international 
                                                 
339 Id. 364-65.  
340 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 10 (footnote 7). See also id. at 107 (footnote 140).  
341 Id. at 62 (footnote 151). See also text accompanying supra note 335.  
342 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 85 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 
687 (1991); David Kennedy, The Last Treatise, supra note 5, at 982-83 (2006); Christoph Möllers, It’s about legal practice, stupid, 7(12) 
GERMAN L.J. 1011, 1013 (2006); Rasulov, supra note 13, at 649-51.  
343 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 1-15 (and in particular at 7, 13).  
344 David Kennedy, Theses, supra note 323, at 355 (footnote 4). 
345 Id. at 355.   
346 Id. at 358.  
347 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 511-12.  
348 David Kennedy, Theses, supra note 323, at 383.  
349 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 60.  
350 David Kennedy, Theses, supra note 323, at 387.  
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lawyers have to maintain a “commitment” to international law despite the very real and credible reasons 
which might lead them to lapse into “cynicism.”
351
  
 
Kennedy calls for “an alternative style of discourse aimed at revealing and resolving the dilemmas of social life, 
rather than hiding them or factoring them out of the discourse of law”;
352
 Koskenniemi produces a theory of 
international legal practice as hegemony which tackles the dilemmas of social life through “empty” 
universalism (see section C. III., “‘Empty’ universalism”). Kennedy notes that, in “Theses,” he “confine[s] 
[him]self to a theoretical description of the patterns which seem responsible for indeterminacy” but that 
“[t]he next step . . . is to analyse a series of decisions and doctrines more rigorously,”
353
 and Koskenniemi takes 
that “next step,” analysing recurrent doctrinal and theoretical “patterns” throughout From Apology.  
 
David Kennedy’s basic concept of international law as a “discourse” is arrived at by “crudely borrow[ing] from 
the field of structural linguistics” – from Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics.
354
 This generates a linguistic 
concept of international law as a “largely unconscious structure which both controls and permits 
communication by the choice and recognition of the variable contents according to fixed patterns.”
355
 For 
Kennedy this approach “can serve as the starting point for explanation of a theory of legal argument,”
356
 
indeed, it seems to be Koskenniemi’s “starting point” in the introduction to From Apology.
357
 Kennedy 
expands, very modestly, on the concept of a “largely unconscious structure” in his 1985 “Critical Theory, 
Structuralism and Contemporary Legal Scholarship,”
358
 “barely acknowledge[ing] Lacan’s work” as “instructive 
for legal analysis,” as David S. Caudill puts it.
359
   
 
Echoing David Kennedy’s notion of a “largely unconscious structure,” Koskenniemi focuses on the “deep-
structure” of international legal discourse.
360
 That “structure” is captured in Koskenniemi’s apology (concrete) 
/ utopia (normative) analytic or, in Kennedy’s terms, in “the contradiction . . . between consent based norms 
which must be externally validated (or implied from ‘objective’ facts) and external norms which must be 
subjectively justified and defined.”
361
 This is a tension which, as Koskenniemi demonstrates in chapters five 
and six of From Apology, “cuts across all such traditional sources as treaties, custom, principles or the writings 
of judges or publicists.”
362
 
 
2. Rising and Falling 
 
David Kennedy’s concept of an “unconscious structure” mirrors Duncan Kennedy’s concept of a “legal 
consciousness.”
363
 Duncan Kennedy developed this concept in The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought – a 
                                                 
351 Koskenniemi, Between Commitment and Cynicism, supra note 90.  
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353 Id. at 367.  
354 Id. at 374.  
355 Id. at 375 (emphasis added).   
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360 KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 6.  
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363 Duncan Kennedy, Blackstone’s Commentaries, supra note 332, at 220; DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT xiv-
xvii (2006).  
35 
 
book written in 1975,
364
 circulated at around that time within closed networks and Harvard Law School,
365
 but 
only published for a general audience in 2006 – and he deploys it in “Blackstone’s Commentaries.”  
 
According to Duncan Kennedy, Rise and Fall influenced “students and young colleagues [who] entered directly 
into the effort to reconstruct the structural transformations of legal discourse,”
366
 including David Kennedy.
367
 
Whilst he does not suggest that David Kennedy’s “Theses” was influenced by Rise and Fall and,
368
 similarly, 
David Kennedy does not cite Rise and Fall in “Theses,” for reasons set out in the preceding analysis, the idea of 
“reconstruct[ing] the structural transformations of legal discourse” permeates “Theses” and From Apology.  
 
The parallels between Koskenniemi’s notion of a “deep-structure”,
369
 David Kennedy’s notion of a “largely 
unconscious structure,”
370
 and this definition, from Duncan Kennedy, of “legal consciousness” are striking: 
 
legal consciousness [is] . . . an entity with a measure of autonomy. It is a set of concepts and 
intellectual operations that evolves according to a pattern of its own, and exercises an influence 
on results distinguishable from those of political power and economic interest. The autonomy of 
legal consciousness is a premise; yet that autonomy is no more than relative.
371
  
 
The identification of a “legal consciousness” is predicated on the idea that “it is possible to isolate and describe 
the significant dimensions or aspects of the body of ideas through which lawyers experience legal issues.”
372
 
This is a “descriptive”, synchronic, analytical, “native speaker” approach to law.
373
 It analyses and describes a 
thing called law internally, through its language, ignoring and avoiding the possibilities and challenges of 
diachronic inquiry into law’s ontology, of inquiry into law from perspectives external to it:
374
  
The point [in Rise and Fall] was not to convert the reader to belief in a theory called structuralism 
. . . Rather it was to take very specific ideas from the literatures of structuralism and critical 
theory, revise them as seemed appropriate, and use them to illuminate, hopefully, specific 
aspects of legal discourse.
375
 
 
I want to focus on the notion of description here, given its psychoanalytic-linguistic connotations.
376
 To reveal 
those connotations I want to almost break the word apart into de-scribe. “Scribing” is, of course, the process 
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367 Id. at xliii (footnote 41).  
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373 Duncan Kennedy, Blackstone’s Commentaries, supra note 332, at 220-21 (“what I have to say is descriptive, and descriptive only of 
thought. It means ignoring the question of what brings a legal consciousness into being, what causes it to change, and what effect it has on 
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called the study of the inner life of the law tradition,” without tracing the internal or “inner” character of Koskenniemi’s work back to 
Duncan Kennedy’s thought.  
375 Duncan Kennedy, Blackstone’s Commentaries, supra note 332, at xiv.  
376 See Caudill, supra note 14, at 661 (“Whilst psychoanalysis can be viewed solely as an explanatory model for individual human behaviour, 
“it also contains the possibilities for an approach that analyses the mechanisms by which the social world enters into the experience of 
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of writing. “De-scribing” is, then, a process of un-writing, of getting inside the text, of “providing an ‘insider’s 
view.’”
377
 It involves extraction of “specific aspects of legal discourse,”
378
 its “deep-structure,” 
379
 through a 
process of de-construction, of taking apart, which leads to an understanding of how the discourse fits 
together.   
 
This is the analytic methodology advocated by Duncan Kennedy in Rise and Fall, applied by Duncan Kennedy in 
“Blackstone’s Commentaries,” translated for an international legal audience by David Kennedy in “Theses,” 
and “received” by Koskenniemi in From Apology.
380
 A review of the literature on psychoanalysis would seem to 
be an essential part of any inquiry into “legal consciousness,” but Lacan and Freud are absent from Rise and 
Fall’s bibliography,
381
 and Duncan Kennedy defines “consciousness” without reference to their work:  
 
Consciousness refers to the total contents of a mind, including images of the external world, 
images of the self, of emotions, goals and values, and theories about the world and self. I use the 
term only in this vague, all-inclusive sense. It defines the universe within which are situated the 
more sharply-delineated concepts that are the vehicles for analysis.
382
  
 
This definition of “consciousness” in structuralist terms but without reference to Lacan, the principal theorist 
of structuralist psychoanalysis, reflects Caudill’s argument that “[c]ritical [t]heory and [s]tructuralism . . . are 
most often identified as the forerunners of critical legal scholarship,” obscuring the importance of 
psychoanalysis as one of the foundations of critical legal studies (CLS), despite the fact that “both [critical 
theory and structuralism] signal a latent role for psychoanalytic theory in critical legal studies.”
383
 If 
psychoanalysis features in CLS work only as “a series of suggestive traces” then,
384
 in a sense, this article 
produces a new reading of Koskenniemi’s CLS-inspired work by finding and linking those “traces.” 
 
More generally, there is a cherry picking quality to Duncan Kennedy’s engagement with theory, methodology 
and philosophy.
385
 Kennedy explains “[t]he goal” of Rise and Fall as the “introd[uction of] critical theory and 
structuralism, including the Frankfurt School and . . . the work of Clause Levi-Strauss and Jean Piaget, into 
American jurisprudence and legal sociology.”
386
 Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Walter Benjamin, three 
of the Frankfurt School’s leading lights,
387
 are, however, absent from a bibliography that, at five pages, is brief 
                                                                                                                                                        
each individual, constructing the human ‘subject’ and reproducing itself through the perpetuation of particular patterns of ideology’” 
(quoting STEPHEN FROSH, THE POLITICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO FREUDIAN AND POST-FREUDIAN THOUGHT 11 (1987))). 
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“classical” in the sense of Duncan Kennedy’s THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 363. Desautels-Stein does not, 
however, save for repeated references to “classical legal thought,” develop the point or trace the deeper methodological connections 
between Duncan Kennedy’s work and Koskenniemi’s thought.   
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382 Id. at 27.  
383 Caudill, supra note 14, at 662.  
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385 See Alan Hunt, The Theory of Critical Legal Studies, 6 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 1, 23 (1986) (noting a CLS “tendency,” which he associates with 
Duncan Kennedy, “to cite the theoretical origins of their positions in a very loose way”). Koskenniemi notes the “review” of CLS in Hunt, id., 
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I, FROM APOLOGY, supra note 4, at 63 (footnote 151).  
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to the point of absurdity given Rise and Fall’s ambitious “goal.”
388
 Duncan Kennedy assumes that heterogenous 
intellectual traditions – critical theory and structuralism – can be synchronically homogenised “in the analysis 
of law,”
389
 paying little attention to the distinct literatures that constitute each of those traditions.
390
 
 
Duncan Kennedy’s methodology advocates a structuralist concept of “consciousness” without reference to the 
literature on psychoanalysis, and an approach to theory, methodology and philosophy that is “vague” and 
homogenistically “all-inclusive.”
391
 Adopting that methodology, via David Kennedy’s “Theses,” Koskenniemi 
has, in From Apology, Gentle Civilizer and his later work analysed above, written what can and should be read 
as a Lacanian psychoanalysis of international law without referring to Lacan. 
 
The roots of Koskenniemi’s work in Duncan Kennedy’s thought have been hiding in plain sight. The notion of a 
movement “from apology to utopia” is at the heart of Duncan Kennedy’s Blackstone’s Commentaries and 
forms the title of Koskenniemi’s first book,
392
 and they have both written books that include “Rise and Fall” in 
their titles.
393
 Whilst these might, at first glance, seem like insignificant, even trivial, coincidences or parallels, 
the analysis undertaken here reveals them to be anything but.  
 
Koskenniemi has loomed large as the “master” of “critical” international legal scholarship and yet, because we 
have remained unconscious of the “priority” of a psychoanalytic reading of his work – something that this 
article aims to remedy – we have described or, at best, de-scribed international law.
394
 We lack the ability and 
reject the possibility of fundamentally changing or re-imageining international law precisely because we have 
focussed our energies on description.
395
 Our capacity to describe / de-scribe “legal consciousness” – our 
appreciation of and enthusiasm for “culture[s] of formalism” – has risen because our insight into the thinking 
that underpins that capacity has fallen. In recent debates on international legal theory, therefore, “les non-
dupes errant” / “those who are not taken in [are seen to] err.”
396
 The international legal scholar’s job – my job 
– is (apparently) synchronic, not diachronic.
397
 It apparently involves the production of reality “affect[s]” 
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through the de-scription of international law’s content from inside its structure, rather than any attempt to 
change that structure from the outside.
398
 
 
3. An Unconscious Language Structure  
 
To recap, and in summary, Koskenniemi’s work is, for the reasons outlined in this section (C. VII), based on his 
adoption and application of David Kennedy’s “analytic approach” in “Theses.” It can and should be read as 
Lacanian for all of the reasons outlined throughout this article, but most especially because David Kennedy’s 
and Koskenniemi’s shared and fundamental notion of a “largely unconscious [international legal] structure,”
399
 
“within which the problems which modern lawyers face, either in theory or in doctrine, are constituted,”
400
 
originating out of Duncan Kennedy’s concept of “legal consciousness,” is synonymous with Lacan’s twin claims 
that “every discourse derives its effects from the unconscious,”
401
 and that “the unconscious is structured as a 
language.”
402
  
 
That synonymy is neither coincidental nor accidental – synonymy is not to be confused with similarity. It is a 
product of the fact that David Kennedy and Koskenniemi, drawing, ultimately, on Duncan Kennedy’s work, 
base their inquiry into international law’s structure on the intellectual foundations of Lacan’s work, on Levi-
Strauss’ structuralist anthropology and Saussure’s structuralist theory of linguistics (see parts II and III 
above).
403
 On this foundation Koskenniemi erects a theory of international legal practice, using Laclau’s 
Lacanian theory of hegemony for support (see section C. V., “Laclau and Lacan . . . and Koskenniemi”).  
 
Like David Kennedy, Koskenniemi starts with Lacan’s forebears – Levi-Strauss and Saussure – and comes (unlike 
Kennedy) to rely on Ernesto Laclau, one of Lacan’s principal followers. The fact that he works with Lacan’s 
major forebears and follower but not with Lacan himself is traceable to his adoption of Duncan Kennedy’s 
methodology (see the immediately preceding section, “Rising and falling”). Koskenniemi’s work can and should 
be read as a de-scription of international law’s (linguistic) “unconscious” that is (unconsciously) based on 
Lacan’s insistence that “the unconscious is structured as a language” and that “words are the only material of 
the unconscious.”
404
 Lacanian psychoanalysis is, for these reasons, the “political unconscious” of and 
“allegorical key” to Koskenniemi’s work.
405
  
 
D. PROGNOSIS 
 
I. Therapeutic Benefits: The Work of the “Master” 
 
I agree with Aristodemou that international law has largely overcome its late twentieth-century “apologetics, 
restorative rhetoric and self-abnegating excuses” to become “a ubiquitous presence in [early twenty-first 
century] global policy making,” a “discourse that is ‘hard to escape.’” 
406
 For me, unlike Aristodemou, however, 
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the “sudden embrace, adulation, and self-congratulation amongst and for public international lawyers” after a 
period of sustained, even neurotic, “diffidence and self-questioning,”
407
 is linked and even largely attributable 
to Koskenniemi’s Lacanian psychoanalysis of international law and its reality “affect” on international law(yers).  
 
The International Law Commission’s work on the fragmentation of international law is perhaps the best 
example of the beneficial effect of Koskenniemi’s psychoanalytic therapy on international law’s state of mind 
and self-confidence. In response to a widespread, late-twentieth century belief that international law was 
fragmenting into disparate elements, each focussed on a distinct area of policy – human rights, the global 
environment, international trade, for example –  the International Law Commission embarked on a study of 
fragmentation and possible responses to it.
408
  
 
The latter stages of that study were led by Koskenniemi and he produced an “analytical study” – perhaps 
“psychoanalytical study” would have been more apt – explaining the study group’s conclusions.
409
 The “study” 
reads like an executive summary of From Apology and Gentle Civilizer.
410
 Recalling the discussion of Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy above (section C. I., “Hegemony”), it amounts to an affirmation of hegemonic practice as 
the response to “fault[s],” “fissure[s]” and fragmentation in the “normal historical development” international 
law had envisioned for itself.
411
  
 
International law is, according to the “study”, not fragmented but a synchronic “language . . . a total system . . . 
complete at every moment”:
412
 “Although there may be disagreement among lawyers about just how the 
systemic relationship between the various decisions, rules and principles should be conceived, there is seldom 
disagreement that it is one of the tasks of legal reasoning to establish it.”
413
 Legal practice is a political 
endeavour, fashioning coherence out of the seemingly incoherent:  
 
Legal interpretation, and thus legal reasoning, builds systemic relationships between rules and 
principles by envisaging them as parts of some human effort or purpose . . .  it may . . . be 
rationalized in terms of a political obligation on law-appliers to make their decisions cohere with 
the preferences and expectations of the community whose law they administer.
414
 
 
The “good” served by legal reasoning is, consistent with the “culture of formalism,” an “empty” universal. 
Hence the “principle of systemic integration” in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties:
415
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413 Report of the Study Group, supra note 247, at 23 (para. 33). 
414 Id. at 24 (para 35), (footnote omitted).  
415 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3), opened for signature May 23 1969) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“There shall be taken into 
account, together with the context: . . . (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”).  
40 
 
 
The principle of systemic integration . . . looks beyond the individual case. By making sure that 
the outcome is linked to the legal environment, and that adjoining rules are considered . . . any 
decision also articulates the legal-institutional environment in view of substantive preferences, 
distributionary choices and political objectives . . . Without the principle of “systemic integration” 
it would be impossible to give expression to and to keep alive, any sense of the common good of 
humankind, not reducible to the good of any particular institutions or ‘regime’.
416
  
 
Koskenniemi’s psychoanalytic approach to international law was uniquely well-equipped to address the 
“phallic” nature of fragmentation. As Deborah Luepnitz explains, “Lacan observed that many human beings use 
the penis to cover their pervasive sense of bodily lack, and so he chose the term ‘phallus’ to refer to our wish 
for completeness. The phallus therefore signifies, paradoxically, the opposition of completeness – that is, 
lack.”
417
 Fragmentation is international law’s “phallic” complex – an expression of its unfulfillable “wish for 
completeness” – and it gave the (Lacanian) “master” the perfect opportunity to demonstrate his mastery. 
 
II. Utopian “archaeologies of the [international legal] future.”
418
  
 
In this article I have undertaken a diachronic analysis of Martti Koskenniemi’s work,
419
 an “intellectual 
[re]construction” of his writings from the “outside.” 
420
 I have tried to avoid the perspective of the “dupe,” to 
be one of “les non-dupes,” to resist the master’s reality “affect,” without “err[ing]” by “dismiss[ing] 
[international law’s] . . . symbolic texture” – its discourse – “as a mere semblance,” and without being “blind to 
its efficacy . . . to the way we can intervene into the Real through [international law’s] symbolic [discourse].”
421
   
 
A synchronic methodology, a psychoanalytic de-scription of the subject’s place within his structure,
422
 
reproduces the fundamental structures of the past in an “eternal present.”
423
 Past and present are 
synchronised in a denial of even the possibility of a future; a denial of any future that is not synchronic with a 
present which demands that the past synchronise with it, in an “insurrection of the present against [all] other 
temporalities.”
424
  
 
Koskenniemi’s psychoanalytic, structuralist, synchronic account of international law is, therefore, in the most 
fundamental, ontological-methodological sense, a denial of the possibility of significant change in the structure 
of international law.
425
 It is erotic; it is in love with the structures and myths of international legal discourse, 
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with an image of the international lawyer as a sutured hegemon,
426
 and with (what it sees as) the beautiful 
truth of international law.
427
 The notion that Koskenniemi’s work takes us on a “voyage” towards utopia must, 
therefore, be rejected.
428
 His work, in common with fundamental trends in late-twentieth and early-twenty-
first century thought that accept capitalism as the final system, has effectively abandoned a (diachronic) future 
and the possibility of (legal-)utopian visions of it.
429
  
 
The most urgent project in international legal thinking is, in my view, a recovery of the “utopian impulse,”
430
 an 
“archaeology” of international law’s future,
431
 a diachronic construction of international law’s future using 
“fragments” of the past.
432
 That recovery is impossible for so long as the international lawyer qua hegemonic 
subject remains alive as the subjectivity that international lawyers are required or expected to adopt when 
they suture themselves into international legal discourse.
433
  
 
Diachrony and the recovery of the “utopian impulse” imply anti-erotic, destructive, anti-structuralist, anti-
hegemonic,
434
 anti-discourse kinds of thinking; a process of “intellectual construction” out of the “ruins,”
435
 the 
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“fragments” of the collapsing structure,
436
 in opposition to erotic labours-of-love that synchronically re-enforce 
it.
437
 It is time to think positively about collapse into “the void,” 
438
 about death as re-birth.
439
 It is time to think 
against our identity as “native language-speaker[s] of international law,”
440
 against ourselves.
441
 Only after the 
death of the image of international law’s much venerated “Gentle Civilizer[s],” past and present, will we be 
able to make “progress and [secure] the production of new [international legal] forms.”
442
 To build any future 
worth the name we must first rediscover (legal) means of imageining one.
443
 
 
Fuseli’s Artist Moved by the Grandeur of Ancient Ruins shows a figure in a state of utter dejection 
dwarfed and enclosed by selected bits of a colossus, which though larger and more powerful 
than he, is in its dismemberment equally ineffectual. The past is conceived as a figure or being, 
now reduced to abstraction or monstrosity. The artist is part and not part of the collapse: his 
posture echoes the cascading form familiar in many scenes of ruin, but for all his solidarity with 
the fallen giant he remains apart, neither buried nor assimilated, revelling now in a fit of 
melancholy which will pass.
444
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